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CHAPTER 18 
Environmental Law 
JOHN J. O'BRIEN* AND JEFFREY G. MILLER** 
§18.1. Introduction. The 1974 Survey year saw significant de-
velopments occur in the environmental law area. The legislature, the 
courts, and administrative agencies all continued to develop policies 
under the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act (MEPA); 1 special-
ized land use plans were set up to protect the natural resources of 
Martha's Vineyard, wetlands areas, and the Berkshire Mountains; and 
important developments in the national air pollution control pro-
gram began to be implemented in the Commonwealth. This chapter 
will focus on developments related to MEPA,2 land use regula-
tion, 3 miscellaneous developments at the state level, 4 and the effect of 
federal air pollution control activity. 5 
A. MASSACHUSETTS ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REVIEW 
§18.2. MEPA: Introduction. The Massachusetts Environmental 
Policy Act (MEPA), 1 enacted by the legislature in 1972,2 mandates for 
*JoHN J. O'BRIEN is Associate Counsel to the Division of Water Pollution Control of 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 
**jEFFREY G. MILLER is Director, Enforcement Division, Region I, United States En-
vironmental Protection Agency. 
This artkle was written by the authors in their private capacities. No official support 
or endorsement by the Environmental Protection Agency, the Division of Water Pollu-
tion Control, or any other agency of the state or federal government is intended or 
should be inferred. 
§18.1. 1 G.L. c. 30, §§ 61, 62, as amended. 
2 See §§ 18.2-.6 infra. 
3 See §§ 18.7-.10 infra. 
4 See§ 18.11 infra. 
5 See§§ 18.12-.17 infra. 
§18.2. 1 G.L. c. 30, §§ 61, 62, as amended. MEPA is reviewed generally within the 
context of its federal counterpart, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 
U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970), in Miller, Environmental Law, 1972 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law§§ 
21.8-.10, at 629-37. 
2 Acts of 1972, c. 781, §§ 2, 3. 
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the Massachusetts state government an environmental review process 
similar to that imposed upon the federal bureaucracy by the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 3 From its inception, MEPA's two-
step environmental review requirements have been a source of some 
controversy. 4 Yet, prior to the 1974 Survey year the only maJor 
development5 since its enactment had been the promulgation by the 
Secretary of Environmental Affairs of "Regulations to Create a Uni-
form System for the Preparation of Environmental Impact Reports" 
(hereinafter the State Project Guidelines)6 which were intended to 
facilitate the early implementation of MEPA. 7 During the 1974 Survey 
year, however, the administration of the MEP A environmental review 
program has been made much more complex as a result of the in-
teraction of several legislative, judicial, and administrative develop-
ments which variously affect the scope and enforceability of MEPA, 
the nature of state agency obligations thereunder, and the procedures 
by which MEPA impact reports are to be prepared. 
Although no authoritative evaluation had been made of the effect 
of MEP A, the legislature apparently was persuaded that it was 
economically and administratively unwise to require the same degree 
of environmental review for activities in which a state agency was a di-
rect participant as for those activities in which state agency involve-
ment arose more indirectly, such as through a permitting or licensing 
3 42 u.s.c. §§ 4321-47 (1970). 
4 MEP A requires, first, that state agencies incorporate into the planning of all their 
"works, projects or activities" a consideration of the environmental consequences of 
those actions, G.L. c. 30, § 61, and, second, that they prepare an "environmental impact 
report" for any such action which may cause "damage to the environment," id. § 62. 
For the Act's definition of "damage to the environment" see § 18.3 n.1 infra. 
5 Although the promulgation of the State Project Guidelines, see note 6 infra, was 
undoubtedly the major MEP A development to take place during the previous Survey 
year, a number of other events occurred. As part of the major revisions of the Mas-
sachusetts Clean Waters Act, G.L. c. 21, §§ 26-53, to bring that statute into confor-
mance with the requirements of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments 
of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972), codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 
(Supp. II, 1972), the Division of Water Pollution Control was exempted from MEPA 
environmental impact review obligations in activities relating to the construction of 
publicly-owned treatment plants and to projects in which an environmental impact 
statement was required under federal law. Acts of 1973, c. 546, § 16. See §18.6 n.5 and 
accompanying text. Other developments, such as the several court actions discussed in 
§18.5 infra, although initiated prior to the 1974 Survey year, were concluded during 
this Survey year. 
6 These Guidelines, initially filed on June 29, 1973, and published on July 6, 1973, 
were later amended on Oct. 31, 1973 by "Amendments to Regulations to Create a Uni-
form System for the Preparation of Environmental Impact Reports." As this chapter 
was going to press, the Secretary of Environmental Affairs was taking steps to refine 
these Guidelines. See § 18.6 n.1 0 infra and accompanying text. 
7 MEP A requires that each of the cabinet offices promulgate rules and regulations to 
implement its environmental impact report program. G.L. c. 30, § 62. See § 18.4 infra. 
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function. With this in mind, MEP A was amended to provide a differ-
ent scale of environmental review for public, as opposed to private, 
projects. 8 Other amendments attempted to impose limitations upon 
the length of time within which judicial challenges to MEPA reports 
and findings may be initiated9 and exempted the Emergency Finance 
Board from some applications of MEPA. 10 These legislative develop-
ments were accompanied by the promulgation of a series of regula-
tions, filed by most of the executive offices, designed to create for 
their constituent state agencies standardized procedures for satisfying 
MEPA's requirements. To varying degrees, these regulations expand 
upon the broad outlines of the two sets of guideline regulations 
promulgated by the Secretary of Environmental Affairs11 and facili-
tate an administrative regime that recognizes the newly-legislated dis-
tinction between public and private project impact reports. Finally, 
during this period the judiciary was presented with several questions 
concerning the scope and enforceability of MEP A. 
The following four sections will attempt to identify and explore the 
dominant themes that emerge from these developments. The statu-
tory modification regarding private project impact reports and the 
administrative procedures that have been developed to facilitate the 
preparation of this new breed of report are discussed in § 18.3 infra. 
The salient aspects of the various executive office MEP A regulations 
and their place within the overall context of the MEP A review process 
are discussed in § 18.4 infra. The statute of limitations for challenging 
MEPA actions and the limited case law that has developed on the en-
forceability of the statute are discussed in § 18.5 infra. Finally, § 18.6 
infra concludes this review of 1974 Survey year MEPA developments 
with some retrospective and prospective observations as to the efficacy 
of the Massachusetts environmental impact review process. 
§ 18.3. MEPA amended: Private projects and state projects: Lim-
ited reports and subject-matter jurisdiction. MEPA as originally 
enacted made no distinction either as to the range of activities subject 
to, or the scope of analysis imposed by, its environmental impact re-
view requirements. These requirements were to be uniformly applied: 
state agencies, authorities of the Commonwealth and authonties of 
political subdivisions (state agencies) were required to prepare an en-
8 Acts of 1974, c. 257, § I, amending G.L. c. 30, § 62. See § 18.3 infra. Note that 
projects undertaken without any involvement by a state agency or by an authority of a 
municipality continue to remain exempt from MEPA. 
9 Acts of 1974, c. 257, § 2, amending G.L. c. 30, § 62. See §18.5 infra. 
10 Acts of 1974, c. 819. See §18.6 n.6 infra & accompanying text. 
11 The second set of Guideline regulations are the "Regulations to Implement c. 30, s. 
62, as amended by C. 257 of the Acts of 1974." See § 18.3 n.6 infra & accompanying 
text. As this chapter was going to press, these Guidelines were being refined by the Sec-
retary of Environmental Affairs. See § 18.6 n.1 0 infra & accompanying text. 
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vironmental impact report for their works, projects or activities that 
were a potential source of "damage to the environment."1 The State 
Project Guidelines were promulgated to translate the broad statutory 
objectives into a uniform format for the preparation of all MEP A im-
pact reports. As a result of section 1 of chapter 257 of the Acts of 
197 4, however, the environmental impact report requirements of 
chapter 30, section 62 of the General Laws have been substantially 
modified. Now, the scope of impact analysis required of state agency 
MEPA reports will depend upon the nature of the state agency's in-
volvement in the project in question. Where an agency's participation 
in a project involves the expenditure of state funds (a state agency 
project),2 that state agency must prepare an impact report evaluating 
the broadest possible range of environmental issues, including issues 
not specifically a part of that agency's statutory mandate. 3 In this re-
spect MEPA remains unchanged. But, on the other hand, where a 
state agency's involvement in an essentially private activity arises less 
directly, as through a licensing or regulatory function, and does not 
involve the expenditure of state funds, the scope of impact analysis 
for that project (a private project)4 need not be as comprehensive as 
reports required for state agency projects: state agencies preparing 
private project impact reports must now assess the environmental im-
pact of the proposed project only to the extent of their "subject-
matter jurisdiction. "5 
Because he determined that the review procedure outlined by the 
State Project Guidelines would not be adequate to provide for the 
type of environmental review now required by MEPA, the Secretary 
of Environmental Affairs promulgated a second set of regulations for 
conducting the limited environmental review and analysis now re-
quired of private projects. The "Regulations to Implement C. 30, s. 
§18.3. 1 As defined in MEPA, "damage to the environment" is: 
[A)ny destruction, damage or impairment, actual or probable, to any of the natural 
resources of the commonwealth and shall include but not be limited to air pollu-
tion, water pollution, improper sewage disposal, pesticide pollution, excessive 
noise, improper operation of dumping grounds, impairment and eutrophication of 
rivers, streams, flood plains, lakes, ponds, or other surface or subsurface water re-
sources; destruction of seashores, dunes, marine resources, underwater archaeolog-
ical resources, wetlands, open spaces, natural areas, parks, or historic districts or 
sites. Damage to the environment shall not be construed to include any insignifi-
cant damage to or impairment of such resources. 
G.L. c. 30, § 61. A similar definition is found in G.L. c. 214, § 7A, which deals with 
the equity jurisdiction qf the Massachusetts courts. 
2 See notes 11-14 infra and accompanying text. 
3 See State Project Guidelines§ 6.1. For a discussion of the scope of analysis required 
under NEPA, see Anderson, The National Environmental Policy Act, in Federal En-
vironmental Law (Environ. Law Inst. 1974); Yarrington, The National Environmental 
Policy Act 26-30 (BNA Environment Rep. Monograph No. 17, 1974). 
4 See notes 11-14 infra and accompanying text. 
5 G.L. c. 30, § 62, as amended bv Acts of 1974, c. 257, §1. 
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62, as amended by C. 257 of the Acts of 1974" (the Private Project 
Guidelines),6 are to complement the State Project Guidelines; they de-
tail the procedures to be followed in determining what activities are 
private projects, 7 what private projects might cause damage to the en-
vironment and thus require the preparation of an impact report, 8 and 
how private project impact reports are to be prepared.9 The State 
Project Guidelines, meanwhile, will now outline the procedures to be 
followed in the environmental review of state projects. 10 Taken in 
concert, these two sets of regulations outline all review procedures 
governing state agency compliance with MEP A. 
As expressed in MEPA, the private projects which are to be the sub-
ject of limited environmental review are to be those activities "for 
which no funds of the commonwealth are to be expended."11 The 
statute does not provide any examples of what activities will or will 
not fall within the range of this limitation. In the Private Project 
Guidelines, the Secretary of Environmental Affairs has attempted to 
provide such a definition by enumerating a number of state agency 
regulatory and licensing functions in which the Commonwealth does 
not have a proprietary interest. 12 Activities falling within the scope of 
this definition will be assessed and reviewed according to the Private 
Project Guideline procedures discussed below. Conversely, actions not 
falling within this definition, such as those directly undertaken13 or 
supported by financial assistance provided by14 a state agency are con-
sidered state projects and are to be assessed and reviewed pursuant to 
the procedures detailed in the State Project Guidelines. In most cases 
it should not be difficult to determine which set of Guidelines is ap-
plicable to a given state agency activity. However, this determination 
may be more difficult in instances in which funds of the Common-
wealth are expended indirectly, as when a state agency provides sig-
6 These Private Project Guidelines were filed on July 2, 1974 and published on July 
12, 1974. 
7 See notes 11-14 infra and accompanying text. 
8 See notes 15-24 infra and accompanying text. 
9 See notes 25-32 infra and accompanying text. 
10 See text at notes 13-14 infra. 
11 G.L. c. 30, § 62, as amended by Acts of 1974, c. 257, § I. 
12 The Private Project Guidelines key upon the operative term "permit," which is de-
fmed in § 3.1 of those regulations as: 
[A]ny permit determination, order or other action, including the issuance of a 
lease, license, permit, certificate, variance, approval or other entitlement for use, 
granted or to be granted to any private person, firm or corporation, including 
trusts, voluntary associations or other forms of business organizations, by an 
agency for a project for which no funds of the commonwealth are to be expended. 
For these purposes, funds of the commonwealth shall be deemed to be expended 
if the project receives any form of financial assistance from any agency. 
13 State Project Guidelines § 2.4(a). 
14 Id. § 2.4(b). 
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nificant personnel or technical services. Unless it is to be sited in an 
"environmentally sensitive area" or an "area of critical environmental 
concern"15 or is part of a series of projects the cumulative effect of 
which is "significant,"16 a project need not be processed under either 
the Private Project Guidelines or the State Project Guidelines, as the 
case may be, if it falls within one of the categorical exemptions de-
fined within the state project regulations promulgated by the appro-
priate executive office.17 Activities of private parties which involve 
neither direct nor indirect state agency participation continue to re-
main unaffected by MEP A. 
Consistent with the MEP A requirement that state agencies prepare 
an impact report prior to undertaking any action which may cause 
damage to the environment,18 the Private Project Guidelines require 
that state agencies complete all environmental reviews before issuing 
their authorization of the private action. 19 The environmental review 
procedures outlined by the Private Project Guidelines utilize a two-
step process similar to that required by the State Project Guidelines: 
an initial environmental assessment and, in instances in which the as-
sessment indicates that the project may cause damage to the environ-
ment, the preparation of an environmental impact report. For the 
first step, the initial assessment, state agencies must evaluate proposed 
private projects in terms of the significance of the environmental im-
pacts which may be caused thereby. 20 The Private Project Guidelines 
require that state agencies evidence the results of this evaluation by 
the preparation of a document termed a "limited environmental as-
sessment form" (LEAF}.21 Unlike the environmental assessment form 
(EAF) prepared in the review of state projects,22 the LEAF does not 
require that the state agency evaluation address any specific questions 
regarding possible environmental impact,23 but instead merely re-
15 Id. § 8.3. 
16 ld. § 8.4. 
17 These categorical exemptions are enumerated in §8 of the State Project Guidelines. 
Section 4.1 of the Private Project Guidelines exempts any private project from the 
necessity of going through the review procedures of the Private ProJect Guidelines if 
such project falls within a §8 exemption. 
18 "No [state agency] shall commence any work, project or activity which may cause 
damage to the environment until sixty days after it has published a final environmental 
impact report .... " G.L. c. 30, § 62. 
19 Private Project Guidelines § 4.1. 
2o Id. 
21 Id. The LEAF is Appendix A of the Private Project Guidelines. To differentiate 
between the scope of analysis required of state and private project impact reports, the 
documents prepared pursuant to the Private Project Guidelines, and executive office 
regulations promulgated thereunder, carry the special designation "limited." Private 
Project Guidelines§ 3.2. 
22 State Project Guidelines § 3. 
23 The EAF requires that a proposed activity be assessed in terms of its long-term and 
short-term impacts upon a wide variety of environmental assets: the use of 
6
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quires that the agency indicate in summary whether or not an en-
vironmental impact report will be prepared for the project.24 Irre-
spective of whether or not a LEAF indicates that a particular private 
project will cause environmental damage sufficient to warrant the 
preparation of an impact report, the LEAF, like EAFs, must be circu-
lated for review among designated "reviewing agencies" and the 
public. 25 
Where it appears that a private project is likely to cause significant 
environmental damage, the Private Project Guidelines require that a 
limited environmental impact report be prepared. 26 Private project 
reports are to be prepared and reviewed according to the format out-
lined by the State Project Guidelines,27 but are to be "limited in scope 
to the subject matter jurisdiction" of the preparing agency. 28 Al-
though it is not entirely clear how the legislature intended that this 
limitation lessen agency review obligations, the Secretary of Environ-
mental Affairs has interpreted the limitation to mean that in prepar-
ing limited impact reports, state agencies are to "fully consider the 
environmental impact of that part of the [private] project which is 
within the jurisdiction of the general or special laws or regulations 
providing for" the state agency's involvement in the private project.29 
Within the context of this limitation, state agencies are to "review, 
evaluate, and determine the impact on the natural environment" of 
private projects. 30 The environmental review of private projects will 
adhere to the textual format prescribed by the State Project 
Guidelines,31 but may require some modifications of that format 
where the environmental review might otherwise extend to areas 
beyond the subject-matter jurisdiction of the preparing agency. To 
recreationally- or aesthetically-valuable areas; unique natural or man-made features; 
historical or archeological structures or sites; the potential use, extraction or conserva-
tion of scarce natural resources; the habitats, food sources, or other areas vital to rare 
or endangered species; fish, wildlife or plant life; rare or endangered plant species; ex-
isting fresh or salt waters or wetlands; beaches; agricultural land; environmentally-
productive statutory or regulatory programs; flood plains; noise, dust, and smoke 
levels; air and water resources; or scenic areas. See State Project Guidelines, Appendix 
A, "Environmental Assessment Form," Part II (Assessment of Environmental Damage). 
24 The LEAF also requires that the preparing agency describe the project and its lo-
cation, and identify all agencies involved as well as the degree of their involvement. 
25 The Guidelines mandate a number of time periods during which further progress 
on the project halts pending comments by reviewing agencies, the public, and the Sec-
retary of Environmental Affairs. State Project Guidelines§§ 3.l(a), 3.2(b), 3.2(c), 7.2-.4, 
7.7, 7.9, 7.10, 9A. See Private Project Guidelines§ 4.3. See also O'Brien & Deland, En-
vironmental Law, 1973 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law § 6.8 n.16 & accompanying text, at 
182-83. 
26 Private Project Guidelines § 5. 
27 ld. § 6. 
28 G.L. c. 30, § 62, as amended by Acts of 1974, c. 257, § I. 
29 Private Project Guidelines § 5 (emphasis added). 
30 G.L. c. 30, § 61. 
31 Private Project Guidelines§ 6. 
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facilitate the identification of state agency subject-matter jurisdiction, 
the Private Project Guidelines suggest that the various executive of-
fices prepare and submit to the Secretary of Environmental Affairs 
for approval "scope of report" statements describing the subject-
matter jurisdiction exercised with respect to the various private proj-
ect activities of each of their constituent state agencies. 32 
§18.4. MEPA: Executive office regulations. MEPA contemplates 
that the implementation of the environmental review process which it 
mandates shall be directed, for the most part, by a system of rules and 
regulations promulgated by each executive office of the Common-
wealth.1 To facilitate this, the Secretary of Environmental Affairs 
promulgated guideline regulations2 to serve both as models for the 
MEPA regulations to be promulgated by each executive office and as 
interim MEPA procedures to be used by state agencies until MEPA 
regulations have been adopted by the appropriate executive office. 3 
During the 1974 Survey year MEPA regulations were adopted, 
and in some cases revised, by six of the ten executive offices: Com-
munities and Development, Consumer Affairs, Educational Affairs, 
Human Services, Public Safety, and Transportation and Construc-
tion. Together, these regulations encompass most of the procedures 
governing state agency compliance with MEPA.4 Taken in the aggre-
gate, these executive office MEPA regulations form a curious regula-
tory scheme, perpetually in a state of flux, and grounded in a wide 
variety of enabling statutes, in MEPA, and in the Guideline regula-
tions. 
The various executive offices have not been uniform in their re-
sponse to the ~hanges in MEPA and to the Guideline regulations. Be-
cause of idiosyncracies inherent in state administrative processes, the 
executive office MEP A regulations were in varied stages of develop-
ment when, one year after the MEPA environmental impact report 
requirement first became effective, 5 the legislature modified MEPA to 
32 Id. § 5.1. 
§18.4. 1 "The secretaries of the executive offices shall each promulgate rules and reg-
ulations approved by the secretary of environmental affairs to carry out the purposes of 
this section which shall be applicable to all agencies, departments, boards, commissions, 
authorities or instrumentalities within each of such executive offices .... " G.L. c. 30, § 
62. See note 4 infra. 
2 These Guideline regulations are discussed in § 18.3 supra. 
3 State Project Guidelines§ 1.2; Private Project Guidelines § 2. 
4 Although MEPA plainly states that the various executive offices are to promulgate 
rules and regulations specifying how their constituent agencies are to comply with 
MEPA, it does not indicate who is to be responsible for promulgating the MEPA proce-
dures to be followed by those state agencies not specifically included within a given ex-
ecutive office. G.L. c. 30, § 62. See note 1 supra. 
5 By the provisions of Acts of 1972, c. 781, § 3, section 62 of chapter 30 of the Gen-
eral Laws took effect on july 1, 1973. 
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provide for the limited private project review. 6 By the time the new 
private project requirement and its implementing procedures became 
effective, 7 the Executive Offices of Consumer Affairs, 8 Educational 
Affairs,9 Human Services, 10 Public Safety, 11 and Transportation and 
Construction12 had promulgated MEPA procedures based generally 
upon the State Project Guidelines,. But, within a month and a half of 
this date, one of these offices, Consumer Affairs, had augmented its 
MEPA procedures by prescribing general private project regu-
lations.13 The Executive Office of Communities and Development 
(EOCD) and the Executive Office of Manpower Affairs (EOMA) have 
also promulgated MEPA procedures but, unlike the aforementioned 
offices, have not structured their regulations to be generally inclusive 
of activities undertaken within their constituent agencies. Instead, the 
regulations promulgated by these two offices focus exclusively upon 
the MEPA procedures that will be required incident to specific func-
tional activities undertaken by component agencies. In this regard, the 
EOCD has promulgated five separate sets of MEPA procedures, a 
separate set of regulations being applicable each to the activities of the 
Housing Appeals Committee (HAC), 14 to the Massachusetts Housing 
6 Acts of 1974, c. 257 was approved by the Governor on May 28, 1974. 
7 By the provisions of Acts of 1974, c. 257, § 4, the impact report requirements of 
G.L. c. 30, § 62, as modified by Acts of 1974, c. 257, §I, took effect on July I, 1974. 
8 Executive Office of Consumer Affairs, "Regulations Relative to the Establishment of 
Procedures by Which Agencies Within the Executive Office of Consumer Affairs Shall 
Comply with the Requirements of G.L. c. 30, s. 62, Relative to Environmental Impact 
Reports," filed Mar. 15, 1974, published Mar. 22, 1974. See also note 13 infra. 
9 Executive Office of Educational Affairs, "Regulations to Create a Uniform System 
for the Preparation of Environmental Impact Reports," filed June 7, 1974, published 
June 18, 1974. 
10 Executive Office of Human Services, "Environmental Protection," codified as Title 
9 of the Code of Human Services Regulations, filed and published Feb. 19, 1974. These 
regulations, based generally on the State Project Guidelines, were later clarified by 
"Amendments to Environmental Protection Regulations," filed on June 28, 1974, and 
published on July 11, 197 4. 
11 Executive Office of Public Safety, "Rules and Regulations Relative to Environmen-
tal Impact of Agency Projects and Activities," filed Feb. 7, 1974, and published Feb. 8, 
1974. 
12 Executive Office of Transportation and Construction, "Regulations Pursuant to 
Chapter 30, Section 62 of the Massachusetts General Laws for the Preparation of En-
vironmental Impact Reports for the Agencies within the Executive Office of Transpor-
tation and Construction," filed Nov. 8, 1973, and published Nov. 15, 1973. These regu-
lations were clarified by "Amendments to the Regulations Pursuant to Chapter 30, Sec-
tion 62 of the Massachusetts General Laws for the Preparation of Environmental Im-
pact Reports for the Agencies Within the Executive Office of Transportation and Con-
struction," filed on June 6, 1974, and published on June 14, 1974. 
13 Executive Office of Consumer Affairs, "Regulations to Implement C. 30, s. 62, as 
amended by C. 257 of the Acts of 1974," filed Aug. 8, 1974, and published on Aug. 15, 
1974. See also note 8 supra. 
14 Executive Office of Communities and Development, "Regulations Under Mas-
sachusetts Environmental Policy Act for the Housing Appeals Committee" (HAC MEP A 
Regs.), filed on July 30, 1974, and published on August 6, 1974. 
9
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Finance Authority (MHFA),l 5 and to three named functions of the 
Department of Community Affairs (DCA) as it participates in the de-
velopment of state-aided public housing, 16 in urban renewal 
projects, 17 and in activities undertaken by urban redevelopment 
corporations. 18 A similar function-oriented approach has been taken 
by the EOMA, in regulations published as this chapter was going to 
press, with respect to the review of municipal applications for ap-
proval of industrial development financing bonds by the State Indus-
trial Finance Board.19 As of this writing, no MEPA regulations of any 
sort have been promulgated by the Executive Office of Adminis-
tration and Finance or by the Executive Office of Elder Affairs. The 
Executive Office of Environmental Affairs has not promulgated any 
regulations apart from the two Guidelines; to comply with MEPA, 
agencies within that executive office are to be guided by the general 
precepts of the Guidelines. To the extent that there may not be ex-
ecutive office MEPA regulations applicable to a given agency or func-
tion, the appropriate set of Guidelines will apply. The following table 
sets forth the MEPA rules and regulations in effect as of November 1, 
1974: 
Executive Office 
Communities and 
Development 
Title of Regulations 
Regulations Under Massachusetts En-
vironmental Policy Act for tile Housing 
Appeals Committee. 
Regulations Under Massachusetts En-
vironmental Policy Act for the Massa-
chusetts Housing Finance Agency. 
Filed 
7/30174 
8119/74 
15 Executive Office of Communities and Development, "Regulations Under Mas-
sachusetts Environmental Policy Act for the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency" 
(MHFA MEPA Regs.), filed on Aug. 19, 1974, and published on Aug. 26, 1974. 
16 Executive Office of Communities and Development, "Regulations Under Mas-
sachusetts Environmental Policy Act for Local Housing Autllorities and the Department 
of Community Affairs with respect to State-Aided Public Housing" (DCA Housing 
MEPA Regs.), filed on Aug. 19, 1974, and published on Aug. 26, 1974. 
17 Executive Office of Communities and Development, "Regulations Under Mas-
sachusetts Environmental Policy Act for the Department of Community Affairs and 
Local Redevelopment Agencies" (DCA Urban Renewal MEPA Regs.), filed Aug. 26, 
1974, and published Sept. 5, 1974. 
18 Executive Office of Communities and Development, "Regulations Under Mas-
sachusetts Environmental Policy Act for tile Department of Community Affairs Ap-
proval of 121A Corporations" (DCA Urban Redevelopment MEPA Regs.), filed Aug. 
26, 1974, and published Sept. 5, 1974. For a discussion of tile functional aspects of the 
urban redevelopment corporation, see Hassett, Tax Aspects of Urban Redevelopment 
Corporations, 1972 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§ 17.1-.8, at 435-54. 
19 Executive Office of Manpower Affairs, "Environmental Impact Report Regulations 
for Industrial Revenue Bond Financing Under Chapter 40D" (EOMA Industrial De-
velopment MEPA Regs.), filed Oct. 21, 1974, and published on Oct. 28, 1974. 
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Executive Office 
Consumer 
Affairs 
Educational 
Affairs 
Environmental 
Affairs 
Human Services 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
Title of Regulations 
Regulations Under Massachusetts En-
vironmental Policy Act for the Depart-
ment of Community Affairs Approval 
of 121A Corporations. 
Regulations Under Massachusetts En-
vironmental Policy Act for the Depart-
ment of Community Affairs and Local 
Redevelopment Agencies. 
Regulations Under Massachusetts En-
vironmental Policy Act for Local Housing 
Authorities and the Department of Com-
munity Affairs with respect to State-Aid-
ed Public Housing. 
Regulations Relative to the Establishment 
of Procedures by Which Agencies Within 
the Executive Office of Consumer Affairs 
Shall Comply with the Requirements of 
G.L. c. 30, s. 62, Relative to Environment-
al Impact Reports. 
Regulations to Implement C. 30, s. 62, 
as amended by C. 257 of the Acts of 
1974. 
Regulations to Create a Uniform System 
for the Preparation of Environmental 
Impact Reports. 
Regulations to Create a Uniform System 
for the Preparation of Environmental 
Impact Reports. 20 
Amendments to Regulations to Create 
a Uniform System for the Preparation of 
Environmental Impact Reports. 21 
Regulations to Implement C. 30, s. 62, 
as amended by C. 257 of the Acts of 
1974.22 
Environmental Protection. 23 
Amendments of Environmental Pro-
tection Regulations. 
445 
Filed 
8/26174 
8/26174 
8/19/74 
3/15/74 
8/8/74 
6/7/74 
6/29/73 
10/15173 
7/2174 
2/19174 
6/28174 
20 This regulation and the one following it in the table are referred to in this chapter 
as the State Project Guidelines. 
21 This regulation and the one preceding it in the table are referred to in this chapter 
as the State Project Guidelines. 
22 These regulations are referred to in this chapter as the Private Project Guidelines. 
23 The Executive Office of Human Services had, in July 1973, adopted MEPA proce-
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Executive Office 
Manpower 
Affairs 
Public Safety 
Transportation 
and Construction 
(Massachusetts 
Health and 
Educational 
Facilities 
Authority)24 
Title of Regulations 
Environmental Impact Report Regu-
lations for Industrial Revenue 
Bond Financing Under Chapter 400. 
Rules and Regulations Relative to Envi-
ronmental Impact of Agency Projects and 
Activities. 
Regulations Pursuant to Chapter 30, 
Section 62 of the Massachusetts General 
Laws for the Preparation of Environ-
mental Impact Reports for Agencies 
Within the Executive Office of Transpor-
tation and Construction. 
Amendments to the Regulations Pursuant 
to Chapter 30, Section 62 of the Massa-
chusetts General Laws for the Prepara-
tion of Environmental Impact Reports 
for the Agencies Within the Executive 
Office of Transportation. 
Environmental Impact Regulations. 
§ 18.4 
Filed 
10/21/74 
217174 
1118173 
6/6/74 
10/4/73 
The various executive office MEPA regulations have several in-
teresting features. To suit administrative needs peculiar to a given 
agency, the standard review procedures of the Guidelines were not 
followed in the development of several executive office MEP A regula-
tions. In some cases these regulations permit agencies to phase en-
vironmental review procedures to correspond with different stages of 
decision-making involved in the approval of a given project, while in 
other instances the executive office regulations have deviated from 
the Guideline procedures and have imposed additional documenting 
requirements. Curiously, many of these modifications are found in 
the regulations of the EOCD. For example, in the EOCD regulations 
governing HAC MEP A procedures, the HAC is allowed to render its 
dures entitled "Environmental Impact Reports," by incorporating by reference the State 
Project Guidelines. By their own terms these earlier regulations expired on Oct. 31, 
1973. 
24 The Massachusetts Health and Educational Facilities Authority is the only state au-
thority which has adopted MEPA procedures independently of an executive office, as 
of this writing. 
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decision in the review of a local determination to deny a comprehen-
sive permit even if the environmental review of the subject project is 
incomplete.25 However, to prevent this modification from abrogating 
MEPA, these HAC regulations stipulate that no action may be taken 
to implement the HAC permit determination rendered prior to the 
completion of the MEPA review, and that determinations thus ren-
dered remain subject to modifications dictated by the MEPA en-
vironmental findings. 26 An interim approval procedure is also found 
in the EOCD regulations governing the DCA's MEPA obligations in 
its review of urban renewal proposalsP If the DCA finds that the 
local renewal agency is unable to document all the environmental im-
pacts of a proposed project as they may occur through the ultimate 
completion of the project, it may make its MEPA findings based upon 
the best information then available.28 In instances in which the DCA's 
approval of a project is thus incomplete, the DCA may require that 
approval of subsequent land disposition agreements be conditioned 
upon further MEPA findings. 29 To insure that this interim approval 
procedure will still produce adequate compliance with MEPA, the 
DCA may expand upon the basic MEP A requirements by requiring 
that the local urban renewal authority augment its initial MEPA re-
view by undertaking a "follow-up" environmental study of the renewal 
project, or a portion thereof. 30 The documenting and review proce-
dures involved in the original environmental review are to be followed 
in such "follow-up" studies. 31 Moreover, "follow-up" reports are to 
address specifically any impacts which were noted in the original im-
pact report as being "uncertain, either in occurrence or magnitude."32 
A similar "follow-up" procedure is found in the regulations governing 
DCA MEP A obligations in actions involving urban redevelopment 
corporations. 33 
An additional documenting requirement, different from that found 
in the EOCD regulations described above, is found in the EOCD reg-
ulations governing the DCA's MEPA obligations in its review of state-
aided housing project proposals. These regulations require that the 
20 HAC MEPA Regs., supra note 14, § 5.l.A.l. 
2& Id. 
27 DCA Urban Renewal MEPA Regs., supra note 17. 
28 ld. § 6.A. 
29 Id. §§ 6.B-6.E. 
30 Id. § 6.1. 
31 Id. §§ 6.1A, 6.1B. 
32 Id. § 6.l.C. 
33 DCA Urban Redevelopment Regs., supra note 18, § 4.3.B. 
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developing authority34 submit, at appropriate stages in its application 
for state aid, documents, termed Environmental Data Forms (EDFs),35 
for each project site then under consideration.36 Apparently, these 
EDFs are being used by the DCA as a vehicle with which to generate, 
in one submission, data to be considered in decision-making required 
by MEPA and other statutes. The responses required by the EDFs are 
much more comprehensive in detail and scope than those required in 
EAFs. It is on the basis of the EDFs submitted by developing au-
thorities that the DCA will prepare its EAF for a given state-aid hous-
ing project.37 
The various executive office MEP A regulations are also noteworthy 
for the extent to which they elaborate upon the relationships among 
the Secretary of Environmental Affairs, other Secretaries, state agen-
cies and project applicants. It should be observed that in the state-aid 
housing regulations described above, although the developing author-
ity provides the technical data in its EDF, the DCA remains responsi-
ble for the preparation of the EAF. 38 However, once it is determined 
from such an EAF that an impact report should be prepared, these 
regulations state that the report will be prepared by the developing 
authority, subject to DCA supervision.39 Some similarities exist in the 
MEPA procedures applicable to the activities of the State Industrial 
·Finance Board. 40 Under these regulations, prospective industrial ten-
ants of municipal financing authorities must submit to the state board 
detailed data concerning the project, the project site, and the effect of 
the project upon the siteY On the basis of this data the state board 
will prepare an EAF for the project. 42 If it is determined on the basis 
of this EAF that a report will be prepared for the project, these regu-
lations require that the report be prepared by the local industrial de-
velopment authority and be submitted as a necessary element of the 
application for state board approval of the industrial development 
bond financing proposal. 43 By contrast, the EOCD regulations describ-
ing the DCA's MEPA obligations in activities involving urban rede-
velopment corporations state that, although the DCA is ultimately re-
34 The developing authorities subject to the provisions of these regulations are local 
housing authorities created under G.L. c. 121B, § 3, regional housing authorities 
created under G.L. c. 121B, § 3A, or any other legally constituted agency with the pow-
ers of a local housing authority. The DCA itself is included within the scope of this def-
inition. DCA Housing MEPA Regs., supra note 16, § 2.9. 
35 DCA Housing MEPA Regs., supra note 16, §§ 1.5, 3.1, & Appendices A & B. 
36 ld. § 3.1A. 
37 Id. § 3.2A. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. § 4.l.B. 
40 EOMA Industrial Development MEPA Regs., supra note 19, § 3.2. 
41 Id. § 4.1. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. § 4.2. 
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sponsible for circulation of EAFs44 and preparation of the impact 
report,45 it is the applicant46 who must complete the EAF for the 
DCAY 
Several of the executive office MEPA regulations contain other im-
portant provisions. For example, in the regulations outlining MHFA 
MEPA procedures, an EAF must be reviewed by the Secretary of 
Communities and Development before being passed on for review 
and approval by the Secretary of Environmental Affairs.48 In addi-
tion, in these regulations the Secretary of Communities and Develop-
ment has given himself authority to override an MHF A determination 
on whether or not to prepare an environmental impact report.49 
Another noteworthy provision is found in the HAC MEPA regula-
tions in which the HAC is permitted, in the review of denials of appli-
cations for comprehensive permits for projects to be funded by either 
MHFA or the DCA, to satisfy all of its MEPA obligations by imposing 
as a condition to the effectiveness of the permit that the MHFA and 
the DCA comply fully with MEPA before making any final financial 
commitment. stf 
Perhaps the most important feature of the several executive office 
MEPA regulations is the extent to which they variously elaborate 
upon the eight classes of categorical exemptions prescribed by the 
State Project Guidelines. 5 1 The categorical exemptions of these execu-
tive office regulations facilitate the early determination of what proj-
ects will or will not require the preparation of an environmental im-
pact report by establishing standard thresholds that in most cases will 
determine which activities will be deemed to have the potential to 
cause "damage to the environment." Typically, these categorical ex-
emptions rely upon a stated activity type,52 project cost53 or project 
size54 as the threshold norm. 
§ 18.5. MEP A: Enforcement. Although the efficacy of the MEPA 
review program will depend in large measure upon the administrative 
44 DCA Urban Redevelopment MEPA Regs., supra note 18, § 3.2. 
45 Id. § 4.3.B. 
46 Id. § 2.2. 
47 ld. § 3.2.A. 
48 MHFA MEPA Regs., supra note 15, § 3.2. 
49 ld. § 3.2.B. 
50 ld. §§ 3, 3.1. 
51 State Project Guidelines§ 8.1. 
52 E.g. housing rehabilitation projects financed by lhe MHF A. See MHF A MEP A 
Regs., supra note 15, § 6.1. 
53 E.g., lhe licensing, certification, or relicensing of certain facilities costing five mil-
lion dollars or less by the Dep't of Pub. Heallh. Executive Office of Human Services, 
MEPA Regs., supra note 10, 9 C.H.S.R. § 204.7 (h)(1). 
5 4 E.g., activities involving sites of less lhan two acres used for the stockpiling of vari-
ous substances. Executive Office of Transportation and Construction, MEPA Regs., 
supra note 12, § 8.2, class 4. 
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process that implements it, there is a corresponding need that the 
process be enforceable. MEPA, as originally enacted, was silent not 
only as to the method of its implementation, but also as to the method 
of its enforcement. Contemporaneously with the development of the 
administrative regime discussed in the preceding two sections, several 
events combined to clarify significant substantive and procedural is-
sues regarding MEPA's enforceability. These events, which include ac-
tions brought to enforce compliance with MEPA and an amendment 
to that statute, have defined somewhat the nature of the MEPA proc-
ess and the procedures involved in its enforcement. 
Some of this definition was provided by the Supreme Judicial Court 
in City of Boston v. Massachusetts Port Authority 1 (hereinafter cited as 
Massport), the first case brought before the Court to enforce MEPA. 
As part of an action brought to thwart plans by the defendant Mas-
sachusetts Port Authority (Massport) to construct a new South Pas-
senger Terminal and ancillary facilities (the project) at Logan Airport, 
the city of Boston argued that Massport had failed to comply with 
MEP A. The Mass port commitment to construct the project was made 
in April 1973, at a time when only one of the two sections of MEPA 
was effective. Section 61 of chapter 30 of the General Laws, which re-
quires state agencies to make afinding as to the environmental impact 
of their projects, was effective as of December 31, 1972, and thus ap-
plied to Massport's determination to proceed with the project; the en-
vironmental impact report requirement of section 62 of chapter 30, 
on the other hand, was not effective until July 1, 1973.2 When the 
Massport board voted to proceed with the project, it also adopted a 
resolution, largely paraphrasing the language of section 61, intended 
to satisfy the section 61 requirement that it make a finding regarding 
the environmental damage, if any, that would result from the project. 
But because its vote antedated the effective date of section 62, Mass-
port did not prepare an environmental impact report for the project. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the project was not subject to the section 
62 report requirement, the city sought judicial review of the adequacy 
of the Massport section 61 finding, arguing that, in the absence of a 
section 62 report, there should be other means for Massport to have 
demonstrated, and for the judiciary to test, the sufficiency of the 
Massport MEPA finding. The city further argued that, in order to 
prevent the purposes of MEPA from being "circumvented by mere 
recitals of the statutory language unsupported by any actual evalua-
§18.5. 1 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 187, 308 N.E.2d 488, 6 E.R.C. 1337, 4 E.L.R. 20314. 
2 The two-phased implementation of MEPA was provided for in Acts of 1972, c. 781, 
§ 3. 
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tion of impact," Massport should have prepared an "explanatory 
statement" detailing the environmental factors and reasoning underly-
ing its determination to proceed with the project. 3 In the absence of 
such a statement, the city argued, the trial court should have permit-
ted it to test the adequacy of the Massport section 61 finding by ad-
ducing extrinsic evidence. The Supreme Judicial Court was unper-
suaded by this line of argument and affirmed the superior court rul-
ing that, since the phased implementation of MEPA was part of a 
"comprehensive legislative scheme," Massport had to comply only with 
section 61, not section 62.4 The Court's decision thus made it impossi-
ble to determine whether Massport failed to comply with MEPA. 
Although the case thus framed did not lead the Court to a defini-
tive statement on how state agencies might best satisfy their MEPA ob-
ligations, the Court's opinion is noteworthy for the extent to which its 
decision may portend future judicial responses to MEPA claims. In 
evaluating the city's argument that the adequacy of this Massport sec-
tion 61 finding should be subjected to traditional independent judicial 
review, the Court made an elaborate investigation of the nature of the 
MEPA process. The Court noted that, although it has held invalid 
administrative determinations that attempted to pass off as "findings" 
mere recitals of stated statutory conditions, the MEPA process is dis-
tinguishable because the legislature has clearly established the section 
62 report as the vehicle for justifying and testing section 61 findings. 5 
The Court further justified its refusal to permit review of the 
Massport section 61 finding by examining the nature of the MEPA 
process within the context of precedent defining the scope of judicial 
review to be accorded different types of administrative action. Agency 
determinations are generally characterized as either regulatory or ad-
judicatory, and the scope of judicial review to which an agency deci-
sion will be subject will be determined by this characterization. 6 Ad-
judicatory actions-actions which are often determinative of substan-
tial rights of particular persons-are subject to judicial review that 
reaches to their factual and legal basis. 7 By contrast, regulatory actions 
such as rulemakings that do not directly affect the particular legal in-
3 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 208, 308 N.E.2d at 502, 6 E.R.C. at 1346, 4 E.L.R. at 20320. 
4 Id. at 207-08, 308 N.E.2d at 501--02, 6 E.R.C. at 1345-46, 4 E.L.R. at 20319-20. 
• Id. at 208 n.37, 308 N.E.2d at 502 n.37, 6 E.R.C. at 1346 n.37, 4 E.L.R. at 20320 
n.37. 
6 For a discussion of the different types of administrative actions, see Milligan v. 
Board of Registration in Pharmacy, 348 Mass. 491, 494-98, 204 N.E.2d 504 (1965). For 
a discussion of the scope of judicial review to be accorded these different types of ad-
ministrative action, see Cambridge Elec. Light Co. v. Department of Pub. Util., 1973 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 645, 659, 295 N.E.2d 876, 886. 
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terests of specific persons are not reviewable by examination and criti-
cism of the factual or legal rationale underlying the agency action. 8 
Because it determined that the finding required by section 61 usually 
would not affect the rights of private parties, the Court ruled that it 
was more aptly analogized to a regulatory function and thus generally 
not subject to judicial review. 9 The Court elaborated further, observ-
ing that in instances in which an agency determination might give rise 
to a public health exigency, courts might be encouraged to overcome 
their traditional reluctance to review a regulatory determination; 
however, such action would only be availing where all alternative pro-
cedures for challenging the determination had been exhausted. 10 
Since such an alternative procedure is contained in section 62, the 
Court refused to utilize this public health exigency exception, notwith-
standing the fact that the peculiar circumstances of the phased im-
plementation of MEP A precluded application of the alternative im-
pact report procedure otherwise contained in section 62 to the con-
tested Mass port determination. 11 
Several questions persist as to how the Court's disposition of the 
MEPA claim raised in this particular case may be applied in future 
litigation involving MEPA. Doubtless the basic procedural require-
ments of MEPA-to make a section 61 finding and to document sig-
nificant environmental impacts in a section 62 report-will be en-
forced by the judiciary. But to what extent the enforcement of MEPA 
will extend beyond these procedural matters to the review and en-
forcement of more substantive dimensions of MEPA is much less 
clear. As noted above, the Court stated that compliance with the re-
quirements of section 61 should be tested and enforced by resort to 
the "alternate" procedures of section 62 "before judicial review be-
comes appropriate."12 This statement apparently indicates that sec-
tion 61 findings will be accorded some substantive enforcement by 
reference to the appropriate section 62 report. Yet several questions 
remain unresolved as to the manner of MEPA's enforcement. For ex-
ample, it has yet to be determined how section 62 reports prepared by 
7 Salisbury Water Supply Co. v. Department of Pub. Uti!., 344 Mass. 716, 184 N.E.2d 
44 (1962). 
8 Cambridge Elec. Light Co. v. Department of Pub. Uti!., 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 645, 
659, 295 N.E.2d.876, 886. 
9 City of Boston v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 187, 210-11, 308 
N.E.2d 488, 503, 6 E.R.C. 1337, 1347, 4 E.L.R. 20314, 20320. 
10 Id. at 212, 308 N.E.2d at 504, 6 E.R.C. at 1347-48, 4 E.L.R. at 20321. 
11 Id. at 212 n.43, 308 N.E.2d at 504 n.43, 6 E.R.C. at 1348 n.43, 4 E.L.R. at 20321 
n.43. 
12 ld. at 212, 308 N.E.2d at 504, 6 E.R.C. at 1348, 4 E.L.R. at 20321. 
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a state agency will be used to test the adequacy of section 61 findings 
also made by that agency. In Massport the Court ruled that in the ab-
sence of a section 62 report, the city could not utilize extrinsic evi-
dence to test the adequacy of Massport's section 61 finding. It is un-
clear whether the Court's ruling would also prohibit the use of extrin-
sic evidence to test the adequacy of section 61 findings that have been 
included in a section 62 report, to test section 62 reports themselves, 
to test decisions not to prepare reports ("negative assessments"), to 
test determinations as to whether a given activity is a "state project" or 
a "private project," or to test any other administrative determination 
made under MEPA. 13 
Challenges to alleged violations of procedural or substantive re-
quirements of MEPA must now be brought within time periods 
specified in that statute. The pressures that prompted the legislature 
to provide a modified scope of impact analysis for private projects 
also produced another significant modification to MEPA-the crea-
tion of a statute of limitations for bringing judicial challenges to 
MEPA determinations and reports. Section 2 of chapter 257 of the 
Acts of 197 4 amended section 62 of chapter 30 by inserting the fol-
lowing paragraph: 
Any action or proceeding alleging that an agency, department, 
board, commission, authority or authority of any political subdivi-
sion has improperly determined whether a work, project or activ-
ity may cause significant damage to the environment shall be 
commenced not later than sixty days after the date upon which 
the secretary of environmental affairs shall issue his comment, if 
any, on the environmental impact report prepared by such 
agency, department, board, commission, authority or authority of 
any political subdivision in connection with such work, project or 
activity, or not later than ninety days after the date upon which 
13 Some of these questions may be resolved as a result of a second MEP A action 
which was developing as this chapter was going to press. On May 24, 1974, the city of 
Boston brought suit to enjoin Massport from undertaking another airport expansion 
project, alleging that Massport had failed to comply with § 62 of MEPA. (Suffolk Eq. 
No. 99492). On July 17, 1974, a similar suit was brought against Massport by the Sec-
retary of Environmental Affairs and the Secretary of Transportation and Construction. 
(Suffolk Civ. No. 521). On August 26, 1974, in the consolidated trial of these two ac-
tions, Superior Court Justice Mason entered Findings, Rulings and an Order for Judg-
ment enjoining further activity on the airport project pending preparation of a § 62 re-
port. On December 6, 1974, the appeal of these actions was urged before the Supreme 
Judicial Court, having been certified for direct appeal. (Sup. Jud. Ct. Eq. Nos. 112 & 
113, respectively). 
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such agency, department, board, commission, authority or author-
ity of any political subdivision shall have transmitted such report 
to said secretary, whichever date occurs first. Any action or pro-
ceeding alleging that an environmental impact report fails to 
comply with the provisions of this section shall be commenced no 
later than thirty days after the date upon which the final en-
vironmental impact report has been transmitted by an agency, 
department, board, commission, authority or authority of any 
political subdivision to the secretary of environmental affairs. In 
the event that the comments of the secretary of environmental af-
fairs indicate his detailed reasons for his finding that such final 
environmental impact report fails to comply with the provisions of 
this section, the time during which any action may be commenced 
alleging that such report fails to comply with said section shall be 
extended for an additional period of thirty days. 14 
By establishing these fixed points-a contingent point is provided in 
each instance-the amendment purports to impose limits upon the 
time within which actions may be brought to contest the adequacy of 
environmental assessments and environmental impact reports. How-
ever, the amendment does not completely resolve all uncertainty con-
cerning the bringing of challenges to MEP A. One such shortcominB" 
in the amendment arises from the fact that the first sentence, ostensi-
bly intended to limit challenges to environmental assessments, con-
tains a textual incongruity that may frustrate attempts to use it to ef-
fectuate the intended limitation. 15 The sentence seeks to impose the 
limitation upon challenges to assessments by marking time from dates 
incident to the processing of a report. Read in this way, the limitation 
on challenges to assessments would be effective only in those instances 
in which a report has been prepared, an event which, by virtue of the 
remaining two sentences of the amendment, is subject to a separate 
limitation. Since no impact report is prepared in the converse situa-
tion, i.e., where an agency files a negative assessment, the limitation 
does not become effective. Until such time as this linguistic defect is 
corrected, it is arguable that there now is no limitation in MEP A on 
the time within which challenges to negative assessments may be 
made. 
There Is no similar inconsistency that would thwart the 
amendment's intended limitation upon challenges to reports. The 
14 Acts of 1974, c. 257, § 2, amending G.L. c. 30, § 62. 
15 The statutes of limitations contained in Acts of 1974, c. 257, § 2 did not appear in 
the 1974 MEPA revision legislation until shortly before its passage. On May 9, 1974, 
nineteen days before the bill was finally approved by the Governor, the Senate revised 
H. 5828, the bill which ultimately became c. 257, to mclude these limitations. The tech-
nical defect appeared when this amendment was made. See The Journal of the Senate, 
May 9, 1974, at 814-15. 
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limitation on such challenges is similar to that for assessments in that 
it also runs from contingent dates. Challenges to reports must be filed 
within thirty days of the date such report has been transmitted to the 
Secretary of Environmental Affairs. The period for filing challenges 
to reports is extended for another thirty days16 if the Secretary of En-
vironmental Affairs has filed comments on the report which indicate, 
in detailed reasons, that the report does not adequately comply with 
section 62. The amendment does not state what sort of "detailed 
reasons" must be provided by the Secretary of Environmental Affairs 
in order to effectuate this extension of the statute of limitations. It 
can be anticipated, however, that in the most egregious cases, cases of 
the sort contemplated by this provision in the amendment, the Secre-
tary will make it apparent, either by express terms or by the vehe-
mence of his criticism, that the period for contesting the report in 
question should be extended by the additional thirty days. In in-
stances in which the Secretary's comments merely infer inadequate 
compliance with section 62, or merely give a cursory statement as to 
the reasons supporting an asserted inadequacy, it may be more dif-
ficult to determine whether the period for filing a challenge to a sec-
tion 62 report can be said to have been expanded. 17 
Several other aspects of this limitation should be observed. The 
amendment purports to place limitations upon challenges to assess-
ments and reports prepared pursuant to section 62. It does not ad-
dress the principal requirements of section 61, that state agencies 
make "findings" concerning their activities. In its Massport ruling, the 
Court held that section 61 findings could be challenged only within 
the context of the accompanying section 62 reportY It remains to be 
seen whether challenges to section 61 findings can utilize extrinsic 
evidence to measure the adequacy of the section 62 report. It is argu-
able that the use of such evidence to test a section 61 finding and, 
implicitly, the section 62 report upon which it is based, would be a 
circumvention of the section 62 statute of limitations if the section 61 
challenge were brought after the expiration of the section 62 chal-
lenge period. 
It should also be noted that the limitations imposed by this amend-
18 The amendment does not precisely indicate the point from which this additional 
thirty days is to run. It merely states that the period for challenge will be extended if 
the Secretary's comments are noted in a specified manner. Two constructions are possi-
ble: either the period will be extended thirty days from the date upon which the Sec-
retary issues his comment, or the period will be extended thirty days beyond the thirty 
day challenge period specified in the amendment (i.e., to thus create a sixty day period 
for challenging impact reports). 
17 This determination might be facilitated by an examination of the Secretary's com-
ments in other reports, as well as by an analysis of the comments on a given report by 
other reviewing agencies. 
18 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 209, 308 N.E.2d at 502-03, 6 E.R.C. at 1346, 4 E.L.R. at 
20320. 
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ment interact with the advance notice requirements of chapter 214, 
section 1 OA of the General Laws, the so-called "citizen suit" statute. 19 
Petitioners intending to use that statute to prevent damage to the en-
vironment in most cases must provide written notice to named parties 
at least twenty-one days prior to the commencement of the action. 
Since this statute appears to be one of the principal vehicles for rais-
ing MEP A claims, it is recommended that Massachusetts practitioners 
pay careful attention to the relation between the statute of limitations 
now found in MEPA and the advance notice requirement of the citi-
zen suit statute. 
§ 18.6. MEPA: An analysis. Like a number of other states, Mas-
sachusetts has sought through MEP A to make environmental consid-
erations a routine element in state government decision-making. 1 And, 
although this experiment has not spawned the plethora of litigation 
that has been the hallmark of the federal environmental review ex-
perience under NEP A, 2 MEP A has been the subject of some 
controversy.3 This controversy has given rise not only to the 
program-wide changes legislated in 197 4 (imposing a statute of limita-
tions on challenges to MEPA section 62 actions and creating a limited 
scope of review for private projects) discussed above, but also to sev-
eral modifications of specific applications. 4 Some of these specific 
19 For a discussion of this statute, see Johnson & Miller, Environmental Law, 1971 
Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§ 8.2-.5, at 150-59; McGregor, Private Enforcement of En-
vironmental Law: An Analysis of the Massachusetts Citizen Suit Statute, 1 Environ. Af-
fairs 606 ( 1971 ). 
§18.6. 1 For a discussion of some of these state environmental review acts, see Hag-
man, NEPA's Progeny Inhabit the States-Were the Genes Defective?, 7 Urban L. Ann. 
3 (1974); Yost, NEPA's Progeny: State Environmental Policy Acts, 3 E.L.R. 50090 
(1973). A compilation of the state and municipal environmental impact review pro-
grams in effect as of Aug. 1, 1974 is found in Council on Environmental Quality, Fifth 
Annual Report 421-28 (1974) (Appendix to ch. 4). 
2 For a discussion of the litigation that has arisen under NEPA, see Anderson, The 
National Environmental Policy Act, in Federal Environmental Law 238-419 (Environ. 
Law Inst. 1974); Yarrington, The National Environmental Policy Act, Environ. Rep. 
Jan. 4, 1974 (Monograph No. 17). 
3 On March 20, 1974, C. Vincent Vappi, President of the Greater Boston Chamber of 
Commerce, testified before the legislature's Committee on Natural Resources in favor 
of legislation which would suspend all MEPA review of private development activities 
pending the results of a study as to what scope of review was intended to, or should, be 
given to private projects (Mass. H.R. 2218 (1974) ), and, alternatively, legislation which 
would "clarify" MEPA (Mass. S. 1468 (1974) ). In support of this legislation, Mr. Vappi 
stated, inter alia, that, because inadequate budgetary allotments did not give state agen-
cies the resources necessary to adequately fulfill their MEP A mandate, private develop-
ers had to contend with intolerable administrative delays and legal uncertainties that 
inhibited business activity. Statement of C. Vincent Vappi, President, Greater Boston 
Chamber of Commerce, Mar. 20, 1974. A copy of this statement is on file at the offices 
of the Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law. 
4 It should be noted that, as in Massachusetts, some other state environmental policy 
acts have been amended. See, e.g., Roe & Lean, The State Environmental Policy Act of 
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modifications have resulted from other legislative enactments. In 
1973, when it amended chapter 21, sections 26-58 of the General 
Laws, the Massachusetts Clean Waters Act, the legislature exempted 
the Division of Water Pollution Control from all environmental im-
pact review obligations relating to the construction of publicly-owned 
wastewater treatment facilities. 5 In 1974 the Emergency Finance 
Board was exempted from the environmental impact report obliga-
tions of section 62 for those of its activities for which "there has been 
previous compliance with said section by another [state agency]."6 
Other modifications have been effected by special clearances issued by 
the Secretary of Environmental Affairs to authorize deviation from 
MEPA procedures when it became apparent that strict adherence to 
MEP A requirements would hinder action necessary to deal with an 
emergency situation. 7 The Secretary of Environmental Affairs has also 
1971 and Its 1973 Amendments, 49 Wash. L. Rev. 509 (1974); Comment, Aftermam-
moth: Friends of Mammoth and the Amended California Environmental Quality Act, 3 
Ecol. L.Q. 349 (1973). 
5 Acts of 1973, c. 546, § 16. The Massachusetts Clean Waters Act, G.L. c. 21, §§ 
26-58, was amended by Acts of 1973, c. 546, to bring it into conformance with the re-
quirements of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. 
II, 1972). The EPA enjoys an exemption from NEPA in all of its water pollution con-
trol activities except those related to the financing of publicly-owned wastewater treat-
ment facilities and to the issuance of a new source discharge permit. 33 U .S.C. § 
1371(c) (Supp. II, 1972). For a discussion of the interaction of the Massachusetts Clean 
Waters Act and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, see O'Brien & Deland, En-
vironmental Law, 1973 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law§§ 6.2-.7, at 144-78. 
Certain defined exemptions to NEPA have been granted to the EPA and other fed-
eral agencies. As a result of§ 7 of the Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination 
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-319, 88 Stat. 246, NEPA was made inapplicable to the air 
pollution control regulatory activities of the EPA, to actions taken by the EPA relative 
to the use of coal in power plants, and to the expeditious issuance by the FPC of an 
electric energy transmission facility permit for a specific site on the United States-
Canada border. Section 203(d) of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, Pub. L. 
No. 93-153, 87 Stat. 576 (1973), exempted the controversial Trans-Alaska Pipeline 
project. 
6 Acts of 1974, c. 819, § l. It should be observed that ambiguous phrasing in the 
statute may lead to some problems of interpretation. First, the exemption granted to 
the Board only encompasses the necessity of preparing a § 62 report. The requirements 
of § 61, that the Board make certain findings, still apply to all of its activities. Presuma-
bly, these findings will be based on data provided by the other state agency or agencies 
whose compliance with MEPA is necessary before the exemption granted by the statute 
is triggered. 
Second, the reliance upon "previous compliance" by another state agency may cause 
some problems where no other state agency can be shown to have MEP A obligations. 
Such a situation may arise in cases in which the Board is the only state agency involved 
in the review of a financing proposal submitted by a municipal department other than 
an authority. Because no other state agency would be involved in this instance the 
Board would be the only agency with MEP A obligations. 
7 For example, "(o]n September 6, 1974, the Secretary approved a request by the 
Massachusetts Department of Public Health to commence emergency spray action to 
control mosquito population to prevent a potential outbreak of equine encephalitis," 2 
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utilized the advisory ruling procedure of the State Administrative 
Procedure Act8 to furnish guidance to state agencies as to the applica-
bility of MEP A to unique fact situations not addressed in MEP A 
regulations. 9 
These developments indicate that MEPA and the procedures 
created to implement it form a process continually developing as are-
sult of administrative, legislative, and judicial activity. If the experi-
ence thus far is an accurate barometer of how the MEPA process will 
develop in the near future, most key developments will be of adminis-
trative origin. As this chapter was going to press, the Secretary of En-
vironmental Affairs, on the basis of more than a year's experience in 
reviewing MEPA impact reports, deemed it necessary to revise both 
the State Project Guidelines and Private Project Guidelines and had 
circulated for public comment draft revisions to both Guidelines. 10 
Further refinements can be expected to the various executive office 
MEPA regulations as they respond to these new guideline regulations 
and as they develop the scope of report statements required under 
the Private Project Guidelines. 11 Although it is likely that the principal 
developments in the MEP A process will result from the administrative 
trends discussed above, it is possible that judicial and legislative ac-
tions could be of some importance in resolving key problems of 
statutory interpretation and program definition. Future directions of 
legislative origin may be influenced by the report of a special legisla-
tive commission established during the 1974 Survey year to make "an 
investigation and study of the implementation and effects [of MEPA] 
and regulations promulgated [thereunder]."12 
Section 62 Monitor No. IX, 40 (Sept. I8, I974); and an emergency exemption was 
granted on Jan. I5, I974 (pursuant to the provisions of§ 3.I(3) of the State Project 
Guidelines) to the Dep't of Public Health to issue variances for the use of coal by cer-
tain electric utilities. I Section 62 Monitor No. V, I (Jan. 23, I974). 
8 G.L. c. 30A, § 8. 
9 For example, the Secretary made rulings regarding the retroactive application of 
G.L. c. 30, § 62 to loan commitments made by the Massachusetts Housing Finance 
Agency, and other agency approvals, for projects processed prior to July I, I973, the 
date on which§ 62 became effective. I Section 62 Monitor No. IX (Mar. 28, I974). 
10 These draft regulations were dated Nov. 25, I974. 
11 Private Project Guidelines§ 5.1. See §I8.3 n.32 supra. 
12 Resolves of I974, c. 50. The commission is to study the "costs and benefits" of the 
environmental review of private projects, the "capabilities" of state agencies to adminis-
ter a MEPA program, and the administrative regime that has been established to im-
plement MEPA. As originally constituted, the membership of this special commission 
was to consist of thirteen members, comprising six legislators, the Secretary of En-
vironmental Affairs, and six gubernatorial appointees (to include representatives of 
business, labor and environmental "interests"). ld. The number of gubernatorial 
appointees was increased to nine (to make a total commission membership of sixteen) 
by Acts of I974, c. 8I9, § 2. 
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B. ENVIRONMENTAL LAND UsE CoNTROL 
§18.7. Land use and the environment. Traditionally the term 
"land use" has been associated with legal mechanisms exercised on the 
local government level, such as zoning and subdivision control. In re-
cent years, however, the concept of land use has been broadened 
somewhat with the advent of urban renewal and other programs de-
vised to promote better utilization of land areas and with increased 
state attention to matters related to public health and safety. The most 
dramatic broadening in the definition of land use has occurred dur-
ing the past decade, as pollution control and resource protection have 
become more prominent elements in government decision-making, 
and as it has become apparent that solutions to pollution problems 
must entail more than regulation of existing sources of pollution. 
Over this period there has been a growing recognition that if a suc-
cessful resource-protection strategy is to be devised, pollution controls 
must be applied not after decisions on land-utilization activities have 
been made, but preventively, to regulate activities that will further de-
grade areas already severely polluted and to protect pristine areas. 
But the application of such preventive control techniques will not be 
carried out in a political vacuum: in many cases resource-protection 
strategies will impinge upon other programs, such as industrial and 
commercial development, which, like resource protection, are impor-
tant to social and economic well-being. Thus it must be realized that 
environment protection programs are part of a larger process that 
rationalizes resource-protection goals with other competing demands, 
and that, when effectively done, this rationalization will dictate effi-
cient land usage. 
As a result of several developments during the 1974 Survey year, 
land use control mechanisms have become a more prominent feature 
in resource-protection programs operating in Massachusetts. These 
developments are of both state and federal origin and in many cases 
utilize, or at least are compatible with, land use control devices that 
are already familiar elements of Massachusetts law. Some of these de-
velopments are discussed in the following three sections. The Wet-
lands Act, for many years an important and controversial resource-
protection program, was revised by the legislature in 1974. The new 
Act is discussed in § 18.8 infra. In response to increasing clamor that 
the scarce and fragile mountain areas of western Massachusetts not be 
ravaged as has been the case in states bordering Massachusetts to the 
north, the legislature enacted a statute specifically designed to protect 
the mountain areas of Berkshire County. This Berkshire mountain 
protection act is discussed in §18.9 infra. The 1974 legislature also re-
sponded to similar pressures to control development in Martha's 
Vineyard. This legislation is discussed in § 18.10 infra. 
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§18.8. Wetlands protection. For some time Massachusetts has 
sought to provide special protection for those inland and coastal land 
and water areas known as wetlands. This protection has been pro-
vided by way of two distinct statutory programs: prospective regula-
tion and case-by-case review. The prospective regulation program is 
comprised of two statutes1 which together give the Department of 
Natural Resources (DNR) power to adopt orders regulating, restrict-
ing or prohibiting dredging, filling, removing or otherwise altering or 
polluting coastal2 and inland3 wetlands. 4 Such orders are subject to 
local review,5 are enforceable in equity, and may be contested by per-
sons who feel that the application of a particular order unreasonably 
restricts the use of their land. 6 Because of the technical complexities, 
expense and lengthy administrative procedures involved in their is-
suance, prospective protection orders are not yet a widespread feature 
of Massachusetts wetlands practice. 7 
By contrast, the case-by-case review of wetlands project proposals 
required by section 40 of chapter 131 of General Laws has become a 
more familiar procedure in Massachusetts land use control. Unlike the 
prospective protection statutes discussed above, section 40 provides a 
unified procedure for reviewing proposed activities in coastal and 
inland wetland areas. 8 During the 1974 Survey year section 40 was re-
vised to clarify some procedural and substantive ambiguities. 9 Section 
§ 18.8. 1 G.L. c. 130, § 105, and G.L. c. 131, § 40A. 
2 G.L. c. 130, § 105. For a discussion of coastal wetlands programs in Massachusetts 
and its neighboring states, see Note, 52 B.U.L. Rev. 724 (1972). 
3 G.L. c. 131, § 40A. This statute also allows tlte DNR to issue orders delineating the 
boundaries of flood-prone areas within which no obstruction or encroachment may be 
placed witltout the express permission of tlte DNR. Id. Inland wetlands prospective 
protection orders do not affect agricultural uses of land. I d. 
4 The term "wetland" is defined in G.L. c. 131, § 40. 
• A hearing must be held in municipalities affected by a proposed prospective coastal 
wetland protection order. G.L. c. 130, § 105. The local review procedure for proposed 
inland wetlands prospective protection orders is somewhat different. It gives a munici-
pality within whose territorial limits inland wetlands or flood plains affected by a pro-
posed DNR order are located an opportunity to temporarily stay the effect of that 
order. G.L. c. 131, § 40A. 
6 Both G.L. c. 130, § 105 and G.L. c. 131, § 40A provide tltat landowners may peti-
tion for a court determination as to whether prospective protection orders so restrict 
the use of their property as to constitute a taking witltout compensation. If the court 
finds tltat the order constitutes such a taking with respect to a particular landowner, it 
is to enter a finding tltat the order is not to apply to the landowner. The DNR may 
take land described in such a finding by resort to the eminent domain powers of G.L. c. 
79. 
7 Inland protective orders are sometimes authorized by special acts. See, e.g., Acts of 
1961,c.548. 
8 The case-by-case review procedure formerly consisted of two statutes but was con-
solidated into its present one statute form by Acts of 1972, c. 784. See Miller, Environ-
mental Law, 1972 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law§ 21.11, at 612. 
9 Acts of 1974, c. 818, § I. 
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40 requires, as a precondition to the lawful undertaking of any activ-
ity in a wetland area, that certain filing requirements be satisfied, that 
an order authorizing the activity be issued and all conditions imposed 
therein be complied with, and that all appeal periods elapse. The 
1974 revision to section 40 continues to emphasize local responsibility 
over wetlands matters, yet refines the procedures whereby local wet-
land determinations may be appealed to the DNR. 10 
The procedure by which permission to undertake a wetlands proj-
ect is obtained commences with the filing of a document, termed a 
"notice of intent," and descriptive plans with the local authority, 11 the 
DNR and the state Department of Public Works (DPW). This notice 
may not be filed until all local clearances obtainable at the time the 
notice of intention is filed have been obtained12 and need not be filed 
for certain actions undertaken by public service utilities, 13 for 
emergency projects necessary to public safety or health undertaken by 
the Commonwealth or any political subdivision thereof, 14 or certain 
other specified projects. 15 Within twenty-one days of the receipt of 
this notice the local authority must hold a public hearing on the 
proposed project. 16 Within twenty-one days of this hearing, the local 
authority either must issue a written order specifying such conditions 
as it deems necessary for the protection of various resources, 17 or, if it 
determines that no such conditions are necessary, must notify the ap-
10 At the time when the coastal and inland wetland case-by-case review statutes were 
consolidated, the municipalities were given primary regulatory responsibility. See note 8 
sup,ra. 
1 The regulation of wetlands activities is to be undertaken by a municipal conserva-
tion commission or, if none, by the board of selectmen, in a town, or the mayor, in a 
city. The regulating authority will be referred to in this section as the "local authority." 
12 The language of the previous version of § 40 imposed much more rigid require-
ments: it required that all local clearances be obtained prior to the filing of a notice of 
intention. See Acts of 1972, c. 784, § l. 
13 Actions incident to the maintenance, repair or replacement of, which do not sub-
stantially change or enlarge, an existing and lawfully located public utility structure or 
facility need not be cleared through G.L. c. 131, § 40. This provision was first added to 
§ 40 by Acts of 1974, c. 818. 
14 To qualify under this exemption the emergency project must be certified as such 
by the commissioner of the DNR and the municipality. This provision was first added 
to the text of§ 40 by Acts of 1973, c. 719. 
15 E.g., mosquito control projects carried out under G.L. c. 40, § 5, G.L. c. 252, or 
any special act; cranberry bog maintenance work, and "work performed for normal 
maintenance or improvement of lands for agricultural use," G.L. c. 131, § 40. 
16 The statute specifies rigid requirements for advance notice of this public hearing. 
These requirements include public newspaper notice, and notice to the applicant and to 
specified municipal agencies as well as to the DNR and the DPW. 
17 The municipality is empowered to condition orders with a view towards the protec-
tion of water supply protection, flood control, storm damage prevention, pollution pre-
vention, protection of shellfish areas, and the protection of fisheries. See § 18.9 n.10 
infra for a catalogue of the resource values to be protected under the Berkshire moun-
tains protection act. 
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plicant thereof. 18 Prior to 197 4, section 40 was silent as to how ques-
tions regarding whether or not a given land was, in fact, a wetland 
were to be resolved. Now, a local authority, within ten days of receipt 
of a written request, may be compelled to determine if a specified site 
or project is subject to the provisions of section 40. To carry out any 
of the duties imposed by section 40, local authorities are authorized to 
enter onto privately-owned land. 19 
Section 40 also provides that persons aggrieved by a local 
authority's action or inaction in a given wetland matter may request 
that the DNR review the matter. The DNR itself may also initiate such 
reviews. The timetable for filing requests for DNR review is rigid and 
was changed somewhat in 1974 from that required by the previous 
statute. Such requests must now be filed 20 within ten days of the fol-
lowing events: the date on which the local authority issues a wetlands 
order; the last date by which the local authority should have held a 
public hearing on a notice of intent; 21 the last date by which the local 
authority, having held a public hearing, should have issued an 
order; 22 or the last date by which the local authority should have 
made a determination as to whether or not a given site or project is 
subject to section 40. 23 Within seventy days of the receipt of such a 
request,24 the DNR must issue a written order25 that will supersede 
any prior local order and which may impose such conditions as the 
DNR deems necessary26 for resource protection.27 Work may not be 
carried out pursuant to the provisions of a DNR wetland order until 
18 A copy of all orders and notifications rendered on notices of intent must also be 
sent to the DNR and the DPW. 
19 The provision permitting entry to privately-owned land to inspect was first added 
to the predecessor of § 40 by Acts of 1973, c. 163. As thus added, the provision only 
allowed municipal officers to "enter upon the land upon which" the work was proposed 
to be done. ld. The 1974 revision to § 40 expanded this authority to give to 
municipalities the authority to enter upon all privately-owned land, thus facilitating a 
much wider scope of examination. Acts of 1974, c. 818. 
20 The statute imposes rigid requirements as to who must receive copies of these re-
quests. 
21 The request for DNR review must be filed within thirty-one days of the filing of 
the notice of intent. 
22 The request for DNR review must be filed within thirty-one days of the public 
hearing. 
23 The request for DNR review must be filed within twenty days of the request for 
this determination. 
24 Section 40 requires that, within thirty days of a request for DNR review, the DNR 
must notify the "applicant" if the request is not in proper form. 
25 Requests for DNR review may be withdrawn at any time until the final DNR de-
termination is rendered. Such withdrawals will be effective unless the DNR, within ten 
days of the notice of withdrawal, notifies all parties that it intends to proceed with the 
determination. 
26 The DNR may enter on to privately-owned land for the purposes of carrying out 
its duties under § 40. See note 19 supra & accompanying text. 
2 7 See note 17 supra. 
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ten days have elapsed following the issuance of the order.28 
Section 40 also requires that before any wetlands project may be 
undertaken, the final order, determination or notification regarding a 
project must be entered into the property title record, and that a sign 
noting the wetlands project authorization must be displayed at the 
project site. Strong remedies are provided for ensuring that projects 
in wetlands are carried out only as specified in a duly issued section 
40 wetlands order. Persons who own or acquire wetlands areas upon 
which a project is being or has been undertaken in violation of section 
40 or an order issued thereunder may be compelled29 to comply with 
the order or to restore the site to the condition that existed prior to 
the time when the violation first occurred.30 Violations of section 40 
are also punishable by fines and imprisonment. The 1974 revision to 
section 40 differs considerably from prior versions of the case-by-case 
wetlands project review statute in that it adds specific definitions, in-
cluding elaborate inventories of botanic and technical designations, 
for many terms that heretofore had been controversial issues in Mas-
sachusetts wetlands practice. 
It is likely that, even with the clarification provided by the new sec-
tion 40, some procedural and substantive ambiguities will remain. 
Hopefully, many of these remaining infirmities will be remedied by 
rules and regulations slated to be promulgated by the Commissioner 
of the DNR. 31 
§18.9. Land use control in Berkshire mountain regions. During 
the 197 4 legislative session two land use control measures were 
enacted for special regions in the Commonwealth. One such measure 
was effected by the insertion in chapter 131 of the General Laws a 
new section 39A which creates a program "to protect [the] watershed 
resources and preserve the natural scenic qualities" of the mountain 
regions of Berkshire County. 1 The Berkshire mountains statute 
28 This provision is in apparent conflict with the statutory rights to judicial review 
created under the state Administrative Procedure Act, G.L. c. 30A, § 14(1). The section 
states that petitions for judicial review of agency decisions can be filed within thirty days 
of the agency's decision. 
29 These actions may be commenced by the attorney general, by the commissioner of 
the DNR, by a municipality, by an owner or occupant of property affected by the al-
leged wetland violation, or by a class of ten or more citizens under G.L. c. 214, § 7A. 
30 Where the action was brought to compel compliance with an order, the remedy 
would probably entail only such restoration as necessary to make the activity consistent 
with the terms of the order. However, where no order had been issued, the remedy 
would clearly require total restoration. 
31 The statute required that these regulations be promulgated by Nov. II, 1974. Acts 
of 1974, c. 818, § 3. As this chapter was going to press the Commissioner of the DNR 
acted to fulfill this directive. "Regulations Under the Wetlands Protection Act, General 
Laws Chapter 131, Section 40" were filed with the Secretary of State on Nov. II, 1974, 
and were published on Nov. 18, 1974. 
§18.9. 1 Acts of 1974, c. 842, adding G.L. c. 131, § 39A. 
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utilizes a regulatory format that in large part mirrors that prescribed 
in section 40 of chapter 131 for the case-by-case review of wetlands 
project proposals. As is the case in the section 40 wetlands procedure, 
the Berkshire mountains statute vests primary regulatory responsibil-
ity in the municipality, with the DNR being empowered to review 
local actions on a given land use development application. A three-
step procedure must be followed before section 39A becomes effective 
to regulate land use in a given Berkshire municipality. Municipalities 
must first "accept" the statute and "designate" an agency (termed the 
hearing authority) 2 to administer it. The hearing authority must then 
prepare, and the municipality adopt, a map or text identifying those 
areas to be subject to the mountain protectiOn statute. As a final pre-
requisite, it is necessary that the hearing authority adopt rules and 
regulations by which it will implement the statute. 
Section 39A contemplates that municipalities within Berkshire 
County shall be able to regulate the development of "mountain re-
gions" within their territorial limits. The "mountain regions" to be 
subject to this regulation are generally defined as those land areas 
which have elevations higher than standard "base elevations" specified 
in the statute for six named river watersheds. 3 The hearing au-
thorities are to use these standard base elevations as guidelines for set-
ting the boundaries of the areas to be regulated under section 39A: 
the hearing authority may use the base levels as stated, may enlarge 
the scope of regulation to include areas below the specified base eleva-
tions, or may reduce the range of protection by exempting certain 
areas above the base elevation. Once tentative boundaries for a moun-
tain region have been identified and set by a hearing authority, they 
must undergo a public commentary procedure that includes a public 
hearing. Within twenty-one days of this hearing, the hearing authority 
must prepare and submit to the city council or town meeting a map 
or text delineating the mountain region boundaries. After such 
boundaries have been submitted to it by the hearing authority, or if 
the hearing authority does not submit such boundaries within 
twenty-one days of the public hearing,4 the city council or town meet-
ing may adopt, reject, or amend and adopt5 final boundaries for 
2 The statute defines "hearing authority" as the conservation commission or, if none, 
the board of selectmen in a town or the mayor in a city. 
3 Base elevations ranging from 1500 to 1800 feet above sea level are fixed for the 
watersheds of the Farmington, Housatonic, Westfield, Deerfield, Hudson and Hoosic 
Rivers. 
4 Presumably in such instances the city council or town meeting will use mountain-
region delineations which were the subject of the public meeting. 
5 The city council or town meeting may also amend or repeal mountain region 
boundaries that have been in effect. 
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mountain regions to be regulated under section 39A.6 Before bound-
aries thus adopted become effective, it is necessary that they be filed 
with. the municipal clerk and be recorded in the Berkshire County 
Registry of Deeds, and that the hearing authority, after public hearing 
and DNR approval, promulgate rules and regulations in accordance 
with which it will administer the section 39A program within the 
region. 7 
Once it has precipitated the designation of a mountain region and 
has promulgated rules and regulations to implement section 39A, the 
hearing authority thereupon becomes responsible for regulating al-
most all development in the designated area.8 The section 39A proce-
dures for such regulation closely parallel those discussed in § 18.7 
supra with respect to the regulation of wetlands under section 40. No 
work affecting land may be lawfully carried out within an identified 
mountain region unless the person proposing to do such work has 
satisfied certain filing requirements and has received, and complied 
with all conditions specified in, an order authorizing such work. As is 
the case with the section 40 wetlands procedures, the process of ob-
taining a section 39A order commences with the filing of a "notice of 
intent" with the hearing authority, the DNR and the DPW. Section 
39A requires that all local clearances necessary for the proposed activ-
ity must be obtained before the notice of intent may be filed. 9 Within 
twenty-one days of the receipt of this notice, the hearing authority 
must hold a public hearing on the proposed activity. Within twenty-
one days of this hearing, the hearing authority must issue a written 
order imposing such conditions as it deems necessary to prevent the 
proposed activity from adversely affecting various resource values. 10 
To carry out any of the duties imposed by section 39A, hearing au-
thorities are empowered to enter on to privately-owned lands. 
Following the format of section 40, section 39A provides a proce-
dure whereby a project applicant, the DNR, or a person aggrieved by 
the hearing authority's action or inaction in a given section 39A mat-
6 The hearing authority must send a map or text delineating the boundaries of 
adopted mountain regions to the DNR. The statute does not state that failure to send 
such boundaries to the DNR would preclude implementation or enforcement of the stat-
ute. See note 7 infra & accompanying text. 
7 Acts of 1974, c. 842, § 2. 
8 Some activities are exempt from § 39A. See notes 23-24 infra & accompanying text. 
9 The § 39A requirement is that all local clearances be obtained before the notice of 
intent may be filed. A similar provision in § 40 is more flexible. Before filing a § 40 
wetlands notice of intent the applicant must have obtained all local clearances which 
were obtainable at the time the notice of intent was filed. See§ 18.8 n.12 supra. 
10 Section 39A orders may impose conditions necessary to protect water supplies, "to 
prevent pollution and erosion, to control flooding, and to preserve the natural scenic 
qualities of the environment." G.L. c. 131, § 39A. The inclusion of the erosion control 
and scenic preservation standards make the scope of regulation under § 39A much 
broader than that provided for wetlands regulation under§ 40. See§ 18.8 n.17 supra. 
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ter may bring about a review thereof by the DNR. 11 Section 39A also 
requires that requests12 for DNR review be filed 13 within ten days of 
specified dates: the date upon which the hearing authority issues its 
order; the last date by which the hearing authority should have held a 
hearing on a notice of intent; 14 or the last date by which the local au-
thority, having held a public hearing, should have issued its order. 15 
Within seventy-two16 days of the receipt of such a request, the DNR 
must issue a written order that will supersede the prior local order 
and which may impose such conditions as the DNR deems necessary17 
to protect various resource values. 18 Persons aggrieved by a DNR 
order thus issued may then seek judicial review pursuant to the provi-
sions of the state Administrative Procedure Act. 19 
Before work may be undertaken pursuant to an order issued by a 
hearing authority or, if appealed, by the DNR, the order must be re-
corded in the Berkshire County Registry of Deeds. If an applicant 
fails to begin the proposed activity within one year of the date an 
order is issued, the project is deemed abandoned and the order ex-
pired. In special circumstances, the agency that issued the order, 
upon request of the applicant, may grant an extension of the order. 20 
11 The statute expressly allows for DNR review of a hearing authority's failure to act. 
But the language used in the section is not clear as to the extent of the DNR's review 
power over all local actions. It states that the DNR may be requested to determine "if 
conditions should be imposed on the proposed activity" to protect the resource values 
listed in note 10 supra. G.L. c. 131, § 39A (emphasis added). While it is arguable that 
this phrasing would permit DNR review of a hearing authority's decision to issue an 
order directmg that no activity be done, or to issue an order that imposed no condi-
tions, it is not clear whether the statute admits of a DNR review directed at changing the 
conditions that have been specified in a local order. The language in the statute describ-
ing the DNR's exercise of this review role is not particularly helpful in resolving this 
question. It merely states that the DNR may issue an order "imposing conditions." 
12 Within thirty days of the filing of a request for DNR review, the DNR must notify 
the person filing such a request of any defects in the request itself. 
13 The statute requires that the notice be sent by certified mail to the DNR, to the 
hearing authority, and, if the party requesting DNR review is not the applicant for the 
§ 39A order, to the applicant. 
14 The request for DNR review must be filed within thirty-one days of the filing of 
the notice of intent. 
15 The request for DNR review must be filed within thirty-one days of the public 
hearing. 
16 By contrast, the DNR is required to issue a § 40 wetlands order within seventy days 
of the receipt of a request for review. 
17 To carry out the provisions of§ 39A, the DNR is authorized to make entry upon 
privately-owned land. See § 18.8 n.19 supra & accompanying text. 
18 See note 10 supra. 
19 G.L. c. 30A. 
20 The language of the statute is imprecise on the maximum length of time for which 
such extensions may be made. It states that the agency which issued the order "may 
grant two extensions of the order for a period no longer than one year." G.L. c. 131, § 
39A. Two constructions are possible: either the agency may grant extensions totaling 
two years by issuing two successive one-year extensions, or the agency may grant two 
extensions, the combined total of which may not exceed one year. 
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A section 39A order may be suspended or revoked by the agency that 
issued it if it finds, after notice and hearing, that the applicant has not 
complied with the order's conditions. The effect of this provision, 
which is not found in the section 40 wetlands procedure, may not be 
circumvented by sale of such land to a third party: persons purchas-
ing land upon which an activity has been or is being done in violation 
of section 39A or any order issued thereunder may be compelled to 
comply with the order or to restore the site to the condition that ex-
isted prior to the time the violation first occurred. Violations of sec-
tion 39A may be restrained or remedied by courts having equity 
jurisdiction21 and are punishable by criminal penalties including fines 
and imprisonment. Upon completion of any activity authorized by a 
section 39A order, the applicant may request that the hearing author-
ity issue a "certificate of compliance" indicating that the activity has 
been completed in conformance with the order and any conditions 
specified therein. 22 Such certificates may also be recorded in the Reg-
istry of Deeds. This provision, presumably intended to limit actions 
brought to remedy alleged violations of section 39A, is not found in 
the section 40 wetlands act. Section 39A does not expressly state what 
means should be used to compel a hearing authority to issue such cer-
tificates. 
The provisions of section 39A are inapplicable to the following ac-
tivities: the use of land for certain timber production purposes;23 ac-
tivities subject to regulation under section 40; certain activities relating 
to utilities; or to uses of land that were in existence, had been ap-
proved, or had been applied for prior to August 14, 1974, the date 
that section 39A became effective. 24 
§18.10. Martha's Vineyard Commission: Land use control by 
regulating development of critical areas and developments of re-
gional impact. The island of Martha's Vineyard, off the southeast 
coast of the Commonwealth, was the subject of the second select land 
use control measure enacted by the legislature during the 1974 Sur-
vey year. Chapter 637 of the Acts of 1974, a special act that became 
21 These remedial actions may be brought by the attorney general, by the DNR, by a 
municipality, by an owner or occupant of land which may be affected by the alleged 
violation, or pursuant to the provisions of G.L. c. 214, § 7 A by ten citizens. 
22 Section 39A specifies that such certificates are to be issued by the hearing author-
ity. Thus, the local hearing authority will be determining compliance with orders which 
it has issued as well as with orders issued by the DNR. 
23 Timber production activities done in compliance with G.L. c. 132, §§ 40-46 are ex-
empt. 
24 Acts of 1974, c. 842, § 3. As is discussed above, the § 39A regulatory system does 
not automatically become effective in a Berkshire municipality. This provision dealing 
with uses in existence on the effective date of § 39A does not address the problem pre-
sented by uses that come into existence in the interval between the effective date of § 
39A and the date upon which the regulatory program which it authorizes is im-
plemented in a municipality. 
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effective on July 27, 1974, creates a Martha's Vineyard Commission 
(the Commission), a governmental entity empowered to administer a 
program to control land use in a manner best calculated to preserve 
the unique resources and economic vitality of that island. To this end 
the Commission is given regional planning responsibilities1 and, more 
significantly, is given broad powers to ensure that its planning deter-
minations are implemented within the several Martha's Vineyard 
municipalities. The Commission's powers are to be implemented, and 
the objectives of chapter 637 achieved, through the operation of two 
separate but interrelated forms of land use controls. First, the regula-
tion of development in areas specifically earmarked for protection, 
and second, the regulation of types of development projects which be-
cause of their size or nature are likely to have impacts affecting more 
than just the one municipality in which they are to be sited. The areas 
to be subject to the first form of regulation are termed "districts of 
critical planning concern." The development activities subject to the 
second form of regulation are termed "developments of regional im-
pact." These two controls for the most part will utilize land regulatory 
powers presently available to municipalities under Massachusetts law 
and may, at a future date, be integrated with a similar, federally-
administered land use control scheme that has been proposed in Con-
gress. 
The land use controls of chapter 637 are not self-executing, but 
must be developed and implemented by the Commission. To facilitate 
this, chapter 637 imposes a temporary moratorium on the issuance of 
any municipal approval required for land development activity. Dur-
ing the period of this moratorium, such approvals2 may not be issued 
except for: activities that will result in a land use not appreciably dif-
ferent from that to which a site is currently devoted; essential public 
activities; activities necessary to alleviate unnecessary and substantial 
hardship; certain transfers in land title; and, subject to certain limita-
tions, the construction of single family residences.3 
Chapter 637 sets forth in broad terms the considerations that are to 
be taken into account by the Commission in developing its land use 
control schemes. For example, it states that an area may be designated 
§18.10. 1 The Commission is to assume the powers and duties of the Dukes County 
Planning and Economic Development Commission which was created by Acts of 1966, 
c. 690. Acts of 1974, c. 637, § 18. 
2 During the period of the moratorium the planning boards of the various 
municipalities on the island may continue to evaluate certain subdivision plans submit-
ted to them. Acts of 1974, c. 637, § 7. 
3 Acts of 1974, c. 637, §§ 7(a)-(f). The statute specifies that the Commission shall have 
been fully organized by Dec. 31, 1974. Id. § 2. The moratorium is to continue until one 
year after the Commission has been organized or until forty-five days after the 
Commission's standards and criteria have been approved by the state. Id. § 7. See note 
6 infra. 
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as a district of critical planning concern if it can be shown to be an 
area whose unique resources make it significant from a regional or 
state-wide perspective, an area having physical characteristics that 
make it unsuited for intense development, or an area that is or will be 
significantly related to a major public facility. 4 A similarly broad de-
scription is given for the types of activities that are to be regulated as 
developments of regional impact. The identification of activities that 
are to be classified as developments of regional impact is to be made 
with a view towards the extent to which the siting, size, effects, pur-
pose, public-service requirements, and other factors cause it to have 
an impact on more than just the community in which it is to be 
located.5 By July 27, 1975, the Commission is to prepare and submit 
for state approval standards and criteria by which these broad consid-
erations may be applied to regulate specific land use proposals on the 
island.6 Once approved by the state, these standards and criteria are 
to be binding upon every municipal agency having authority in mat-
ters related to land use. 7 
The procedure by which the Commission's standards and criteria 
will be used to identify and protect districts of critical environmental 
concern commences with the "nomination" of areas for such 
designation.8 Within forty-five days the Commission must indicate in 
writing whether or not it "accepts" the nomination. 9 Within sixty days 
of accepting a nomination the Commission must indicate in writing 
whether or not it has decided to "designate" the area as a district of 
critical planning concern. 10 As part of any district designation, the 
Commission must also issue guidelines specifying various environmen-
tal considerations that should be addressed by municipal agencies 
processing applications for development within the district.U Within 
three months of a district designation, the municipality must promul-
4 Acts of 1974, c. 637, § 9. 
5 Id. § 13. 
8 The Secretary of Communities and Development, with the concurrence of such 
other cabinet members as the governor may designate, is to review and approve, disap-
prove, or amend and approve the standards and criteria submitted by the Commission. 
The Secretary must complete this review within forty-five days of receiving the 
Commission's standards and criteria. Acts of 1974, c. 637, § 5. 
7 Acts of 1974, c. 637, § 5. 
s Id. § 9. Nominations may be made by the Commission, by various municipal agen-
cies, and by twenty-five or more taxpayers from any town on the island. Initial nomina-
tions may not be submitted until July 27, 1975, or until the state has approved the 
Commission's standards and criteria, whichever occurs first. 
9 Acts of 1974, c. 637, § 9. The Commission may consolidate the nominations of con-
tiguous areas. 
to Acts of 1974, c. 637, § 9. With limited exceptions, no municipal agency may issue a 
permit for land development in an area for which a nomination has been accepted. ld. 
§ 10. 
11 Id. § 9. 
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gate regulations by which its agencies are to ensure that land de-
velopment activity will not be carried out in the district except in con-
formance with the purposes of the district designation and the 
guidelines issued therewith. In the event that the municipality fails to 
promulgate such regulations within this time, or promulgates regula-
tions that do not adequately comply with the guidelines, the Commis-
sion may it.self adopt regulations regulating development in the 
districtY Regulations thus adopted by the Commission are to be ad-
ministered and enforced by the appropriate municipal agency. Any 
applicant for a municipal permit to develop land in a designated dis-
trict must bear the burden of proof that all environmental considera-
tions specified in the Commission's guidelines have been adhered to. 13 
A much more direct procedure is to be used in regulating de-
velopments of regional impact. Once approved by the state, the 
Commission's standards and criteria for regulating such developments 
are immediately binding upon municipal agencies having jurisdiction 
in matters related to land development.14 Municipal agencies receiving 
applications for land development activities must determine whether 
or not the proposed activity is a development of regional impact as 
defined in the Commission's standards and criteria. Upon determin-
ing that a proposed activity would constitute such a development, the 
municipality must immediately refer the application to the 
Commission15 and may not act favorably thereon until so authorized 
by the Commission. 16 The Commission may permit a municipal 
agency to act favorably on applications for a development of regional 
impact only if it finds that the social, economic and environmental 
benefits of the project will outweigh any detriments that will be 
caused thereby, that the project will not impede local or regional 
growth plans, that the project is consistent with local and regional so-
cial objectives, and, if the project is to be located in an area that has 
already been designated as a district of critical planning concern, that 
it is consistent with regulations promulgated to guide development in 
that area. 17 In permitting a municipality to act favorably upon an ap-
plication for a development of regional impact, the Commission may 
also impose such conditions as it deems necessary to minimize 
economic, social or environmental damage. 18 
Several features of chapter 637 and its procedures are worthy of 
note. First, the statute requires that certain actions be undertaken only 
12 ld. § 11. 
13 ld. § 9. 
14 Id. § 14. 
15 ld. 
16 Id. §§ 15, 17. 
17 Id. § 15. 
18 ld.§l7. 
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after public notice and hearing. 19 Such opportunity for public com-
ment must be made incident to the designation of,20 termination of 
designation of, 21 and adoption of regulations to control developments 
in22 districts of critical planning concern, as well as the review by the 
Commission of applications for developments of regional impact.23 
Curiously, no such opportunity for public comment is required as 
part of the process by which the Commission prepares, and the state 
approves, the standards and criteria that are to serve as the basis for 
the chapter 63 7 land use control program. 24 
One of the most interesting aspects of chapter 637 is its reliance 
upon a regional governmental entity, the Commission, as the principal 
actor in land use regulation. Although it shifts control over land use 
from a local to a regional entity, the statute makes it plain that the 
source of land use control authority is still to arise primarily from 
legal mechanisms traditionally exercised on the local government 
level. In this regard, chapter 637 specifically states that the regulations 
adopted by the Commission for the protection of districts of critical 
planning concern and for the regulation of developments of regional 
impact may utilize powers conferred upon municipalities by zoning, 
subdivision control, wetlands protection, and other statutes.25 How-
ever, in instances where the Commission finds that local ordinances or 
by-laws do not furnish sufficient authority to achieve the purposes of 
the Act, it may promulgate regulations or impose conditions that are 
different in scope and magnitude from such local ordinances and 
by-laws.26 
The statute also requires that the Commission provide written ex-
planations of its reasons for taking certain actions. Such requirements 
arise when it accepts or rejects areas nominated for consideration as 
districts of critical planning concern,27 when it designates or rescinds 
the designation of such districts, 28 and when it promulgates for a 
municipality regulations by which such districts are to be protected. 29 
The Commission must also evidence its evaluation of the relative 
19 These actions must generally conform to the procedures outlined in the Mas-
sachusetts Administrative Procedure Act for the promulgation of rules and regulations. 
See G.L. c. 30A, § 2. 
20 Acts of 1974, c. 637, § 9. 
21 Id. § 12. 
22 Id. § 11. This requirement applies both to municipalities promulgating such regu-
lations and to the promulgation of regulations for municipalities by the Commission. 
23 Acts of 1974, c. 637, § 15. 
24 See id. § 8. 
25 Id. § 3. 
26 ld. 
27 Id. § 9. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. § 11. 
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merits of a proposed development of regional impact. 3° Finally, 
whenever it finds it necessary to promulgate regulations or impose 
conditions that exceed the scope and magnitude of ~xisting by-laws or 
ordinances, it must document why continued utilization of the local 
ordinance or by-law would not be adequate to ensure that the objec-
tives of chapter 637 were achieved. 31 
The statute provides that judicial review may be obtained by per-
sons aggrieved by determinations of the Commissio111. 32 
At some time in the future, the land use control Strategy of chapter 
637 may be combined with a control program established under fed-
eral law. Since 1972, proposals to create a federal land trust encom-
passing Martha's Vineyard and the other islands in Nantucket Sound 
have been filed in Congress. 33 Several public hearings have been held 
on these proposals34 and the matter seems to have, reached some de-
gree of public acceptance in the region. 35 A proposal submitted to 
Congress during 1974 called for the creation of three trust 
commissions-one each for Nantucket, Martha's Vineyard, and the 
Elizabeth Islands-and the establishment of a land regulatory system 
somewhat different from that created by chapter 637. Specifically, the 
federal proposal would create three general land use classifications. 36 
Upon the effective date of the federal act all lands in the trust area 
would immediately be designated within one of these three land clas-
sifications. Although chapter 637 and this federal proposal are di-
rected towards a common objective-the protection of fragile island 
resources-it remains to be seen whether the land use control 
mechanisms created by these two statutes can be effectively coordi-
nated. 
C. MISCELLANEOUS DEVELOPMENTS IN MASSACHUSETTS 
§18.11. Miscellaneous developments. Two other developments 
during the 1974 Survey year warrant mention: the consolidation of 
state executive agencies having environmental protection jurisdiction 
and the imposition of restrictions on the use of steel jaw leghold traps. 
Environmental reorganization. As a result of legislative action during 
30 Id. § 16. 
31 Id. § 3. 
32 Id. § 18. 
33 For a discussion of the early proposals to create a special land use protection 
scheme in this area see Gifford, An Island Trust: Leading Edges in Land-Use Laws, 11 
Harv.]. Legis. 417 (1974). 
34 See Hearings on S. 1929 Before the Subcomm. on Parks and Recreation of the 
Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). 
35 On March 14, 1974, the people of Martha's Vineyard voted to endorse the provi-
sions of the state act. See Acts of 1974, c. 637, § l(f). 
36 S. 3536, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 5 (1974). 
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the 1974 Survey year, all state executive agencies having jurisdiction 
in matters related to environmental protection are to be consolidated 
within a single executive office. Chapter 806 of the Acts of 197 4 adds 
to the General Laws a new chapter 21A which gives the Secretary of 
Environmental Affairs authority over environmental agencies for-
merly located in the Departments of Agriculture, Natural Resources, 
Public Health, Public Safety, and Public Works, as well as several in-
dependent state agencies, such as the Metropolitan District Commis-
sion. To achieve some degree of functional cohesion, these agencies 
are assigned within five new departments. 
Leghold traps. Chapter 796 of the Acts of 1974 amends chapter 131 
of the General Laws by inserting therein a new section 80A which im-
poses restrictions upon the use of steel jaw leghold traps and other 
devices in the hunting of fur-bearing mammals. No person may set or 
use steel jaw leghold traps except upon land which they own or lease 
or, if set in water, in such a fashion to ensure that animals captured 
therein drown within a minimum length of time. Other devices may 
be used to trap fur-bearing mammals if they are capable of killing 
such animals at the moment of capture or of capturing them unhurt. 
The Director of the Division of Fisheries and Game may promul-
gate rules and regulations whereby persons who have on their prop-
erty severe animal problems may obtain special permits, for terms not 
to exceed ninety days, allowing them to use devices that cannot ensure 
that the animal will be captured without suffering. In no event may 
the Director issue such a permit for the use of a steel jaw leghold 
trap. Violations of section 80A are punishable by fine and imprison-
ment. 
D. AIR PoLLUTION CoNTROL 
§18.12. Introduction. The basic statutory and regulatory re-
quirements for controlling air pollution under the federal Clean Air 
Act1 (the Act) by the Massachusetts Department of Public Health 
(DPH) and the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) were 
summarized in the 1972 Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law.2 The Act 
was significantly amended in regard to power plants and major fuel 
burning sources by the Energy Supply and Environmental Coordina-
tion Act of 1974.3 Apart from those amendments, enforcement of ex-
isting air pollution regulatory requirements (principally contained in 
regulations promulgated by the DPH in conformity with the require-
ments of the Act and known collectively as the "State Implementation 
Plan" or SIP) has proceeded apace and there have been significant 
§18.12. 1 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 et seq. (1970). 
2 1972 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§ 21.2-.26, at 578-602. 
3 Pub. L. No. 93-319, 88 Stat. 246 (1974). 
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developments in areas forecasted in the earlier volume. Those de-
velopments include: the promulgation of transporta(ion control plans 
for Boston and Springfield; the promulgation of reaulations to main-
tain air quality standards once attained (including indirect source re-
view); developments relating to the issue of non-d~gradation of air 
quality; and statutory and regulatory activity relating to variances 
from, and revisions to, the state implementation plan. This section will 
examine those developments and presupposes a working knowledge 
of the Act.4 
§18.13. Energy Supply and Environmental C~dination Act of 
1974 (ESECA). ESECA was formulated in respons¢ to the demands 
of the energy crisis and contains a number of enetgy-related provi-
sions. Only those relating to the Clean Air Act will be discussed here. 
ESECA directs the Federal Energy Administratior\1 (FEA) to order 
power plants to burn coal and authorizes it to order other "major fuel 
burning installations" to do the same, under conpitions discussed 
below. 1 Orders can be either temporary (until June 30, 1975) or 
long-term, taking effect after June 30, 1975. Because of their limited 
significance, temporary orders will not be discussed here (indeed, 
FEA has not issued any such orders). Long-term or~rs can be issued 
if: (1) FEA finds that it is practicable for the facility to burn coal; coal 
and coal transportation facilities are available; and cdnversion will not 
impair reliability of service if the facility is a power plant; and (2) pub-
lic participation procedures are observed. But such <)rders cannot be-
come effective: (1) unless the Environmental Protectifn Agency (EPA) 
indicates that the facility can burn coal and meet al. applicable State 
Implementation Plan (SIP) requirements, or (2) until the date EPA 
certifies as the earliest date the facility will be able to meet require-
ments established by EPA to assure that emissions from the facility, 
once it burns coal, can be controlled sufficiently so that they will not 
cause primary air quality standard violations. 2 
1 
ESECA adds section 119 to the Clean Air Act. 3 · The section au-
thorizes EPA to grant air pollution sources temporary suspensions of 
fuel-related SIP requirements (until June 30, 1975) ~nd to issue long-
term compliance date extensions to such sources. Again, because of 
the temporal insignificance of the temporary suspensions, they will 
not be discussed here.4 EPA is directed to issue conjtpliance date ex-
4 A review of 1972 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law§§ 21.2-.26, at 578-60~ may be helpful. See 
also Jorling, The Federal Law of Air Pollution Control, Federal Environmental Law 
1058-II48 (Environ. Law Inst. 1974). 
§18.13. 1 ESECA § 2(a), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 792(a). 
2 ESECA § 2(b)(3), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 792(b)(3). 
3 ESECA § 3, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-10. 
4 It is interesting to note that the three temporary suspensions i~ued by EPA to date 
have been in Massachusetts: to New England Power Company's Brayton Point and 
Salem plants and to the Montaup Electric Company's plant. 
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tensions to s.ources ordered to convert to coal by FEA or voluntarily 
beginning and completing conversions to coal within certain specified 
sets of dates. 5 Compliance date extensions can only be issued, how-
ever, if EPA finds that: (1) coal conforming to SIP requirements is not 
available to the facility; (2) the source can meet requirements estab-
lished by EPA to assure that emissions from the facility, once it burns 
coal, can be controlled sufficiently to assure that they will not cause 
primary air quality standard violations ("primary standard condi-
tions"); and (3) EPA has approved a plan and schedule to bring the 
source into compliance by December 31, 1978 with presently existing 
SIP requirements either by the provision of long-term supplies of coal 
conforming to SIP requirements or by emission controls. 6 In establish-
ing primary standard conditions, EPA must observe public participa-
tion requirements and consult with state air pollution control agencies. 
Violations of primary standard conditions may be dealt with in 
accordance with EPA's normal enforcement mechanisms or by revoca-
tion of the compliance date extension. 7 It is unclear whether the 
citizen's suit provision of the Act applies to violations of primary stan-
dard or other compliance date extension provisions. There is a 
specific provision indicating that states are not barred from doing so, 
perhaps implying that all others are. 8 But such a standard or provi-
sion would appear to be an "emission standard or limitation" under 
the Act, which citizens are specifically authorized to enforce. 9 
EPA is authorized to allocate emission control devices suitable for 
sources receiving compliance date extensions to areas of greatest en-
vironmental need. 1° FEA is directed to allocate low sulfur fuel to 
areas of greatest environmental need in any allocation program it 
undertakes. 11 
Other provisions of ESECA are discussed below in regard to the 
particular air pollution regulations they affect. 
§18.14. Transportation control plans. 1 National air quality stan-
5 Section ll9(c)(l), codified at 42 U.S.C. § l857c-lO(c)(l). 
6 Section ll9(c)(2), codified at 42 U.S.C. § l857c-lO(c)(2). 
7 Section ll9(d)(3), codified at 42 U.S.C. § l857c-lO(d)(3). 
8 Section ll9(d)(4), codified at 42 U.S.C. § l857c-lO(d)(4). 
9 42 U.S.C. § l857h-2(a)(l) (1970). 
10 Section ll9(e). 
11 ESECA § 7(a), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 793. 
§ 18.14. 1 See Bracken, Transportation Controls under the Clean Air Act: A Legal 
Analysis, 15 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 749 (1974). In addition, the prologue to a Fed-
eral Register notice of proposed rulemaking recounts in great detail the events leading 
to the promulgation by EPA of transportation control plans, as well as EPA's commen-
tary on the various strategies that can be incorporated in transportation control plans. 
38 Fed. Reg. 30626 (1973). 
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dards have been established for six air pollutants unP,er the Act. 2 The 
Clean Air Act . required the development either by the states or by 
EPA of state implementation plans to achieve these standards.3 While 
most air pollutants are emitted from stationary sources, carbon 
monoxide (CO), hydrocarbons (HC) and photochemical oxidants 
(smog) are associated primarily with the automobile.4 The achieve-
ment of standards for those three pollutants in som¢ areas, therefore, 
is dependent on reducing emissions from automobties, either by con-
trolling emissions from diem or by reducing the use jof automobiles in 
those areas. Congress foresaw this necessity and dejUt with it in pro-
viding that state implementation plans should contain such measures 
as are needed to assure the attainment and maintqnance of the na-
tional standards, "including, but not limited to, land~use and transpor-
tation controls."5 -
Because of the complexity of transportation cont:ttols and the inex-
perience of EPA and the states with them, EPA sought to exercise its 
authority under the Act to defer until February 15, J973 the required 
submission of transportation control plans (TCPs) by the states for 
those areas where TCPs were necessary to achieve national air quality 
standards, and to extend by two years the May 31, 1975 date by which 
the standards would otherwise have to be met in tqose areas. 6 EPA's 
actions in this regard, however, were successfully ch~lenged and EPA 
was ordered to rescind the extensions and require !affected states to 
immediately submit TCPs to achieve the national air I quality standards 
i 
2 40 C.F.R. Part 50 (1974). Air-quality standards are established! at levels calculated to 
protect public health and welfare. See generally 1972 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law§§ 21.2, .4, 
at 578, 584. 
3 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1970). 
4 Air-pollution sources are defined as stationary, mobile ot indirect. Stationary 
sources are those sources situated at given locations that themklves emit pollutants 
' (power plants, heavy manufacturing facilities, incinerators). Mobile sources are mobile 
sources that themselves emit pollutants (automobiles). Indirect st>urces (sometimes re-
ferred to as complex sources) are sources situated at given locatidns that themselves do 
not emit pollutants but attract mobile sources that do emit pollutattts, e.g., sport arenas, 
shopping centers, parking lots. CO and HC are emitted direcdy from automobiles and 
smog is the product of HC and nitrogen oxides in the atmospherk under the influence 
of sunlight. Nationally, half of the HC emissions are from mobile lwurces and over 60% 
of CO emissions are from such sources. Hoffman, National Invd.tory of Air Pollutant 
Emissions (1968); Environmental Protection Agency, Air Pollution Document 73, at 3 
(1970). 
5 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(B) (1970). 
8 The Act requires that SIPs meet national primary air quality standards within three 
years of their approval by EPA. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(A) (1979). The Massachusetts 
SIP was approved on May 31, 1972, 37 Fed. Reg. 10872 (1972), ~d attainment of the 
primary air quality standards in Massachusetts is mandated by May 31, 1975. The Act, 
however, permits two-year extensions for the attainment of national standards in any 
area where EPA finds that the necessary technology is unavailable to meet such stan-
dards. 42 U.S.C. § 1857(e) (1970). For EPA's actions in this regard, see 37 Fed. Reg. 
10842, 10845 (1972) and its approval of individual SIPs in 40 C.F.R. Part 52 (1974). 
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by May 31, 1975.7 EPA took the required actions both in letters to the 
governors of the affected states and by notice in the Federal Register. 8 
Since Springfield and Boston were among those areas for which a 
TCP was required9 and Massachusetts did not submit TCPs for those 
areas, EPA proposed TCPs for Springfield and Boston on March 20 
and July 2, 1973 respectively. 10 After hearings and the review of pub-
lic comments, EPA promulgated final TCPs for those areas on 
November 7 and 8, 1973.U 
In the Boston Intrastate Air Quality Control Region (the Boston 
AQCR) EPA calculated on the basis of air pollution data collected at 
various sites that a 69% reduction in HC and a 59% reduction in CO 
were necessary to achieve national standards. 12 EPA expected that ap-
proximately one-third and one-half, respectively, of those reductions 
would be achieved by 1975 as a result of progressively more effective 
air pollution controls required by the Act to be installed on post-1970 
model year automobiles by their manufacturersP This left reductions 
of 44% in HC and 25% of CO to be achieved by a TCP. To achieve 
these reductions EPA promulgated a TCP containing regulations of 
three basic types: (1) restrictions on emissions of HC from stationary 
sources; (2) requirements for the installation and maintenance of con-
trol equipment on automobiles to reduce emission of HC and CO; 
and (3) various measures to reduce vehicle miles travelled (VMT) and 
thus reduce emissions of HC and CO. All of these measures relate 
only to the Boston AQCR or portions thereof. 
Restrictions on emissions of HC from stationary sources are not an 
innovation, but merely an extension of an existing state-wide HC con-
trol strategy to a greater variety of sources in the Boston AQCR. 14 
7 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 475 F.2d 968, 4 E.R.C. 1945 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973). 
8 38 Fed. Reg. 7323 (1973). See the transportation control measures contemplated as 
part of the control strategies designed to meet air quality standards, 40 C.F.R. § 5l.l(n) 
(1974). 
9 40 C.F.R. § 52.ll28 (1974). 
10 38 Fed. Reg. 7327, 17689 (1973). 
11 38 Fed. Reg. 30827, 30960 (1973). 
12 38 Fed. Reg. 30960 (1973). For updated figures, see 41 Fed. Reg. 8668 (1975). 
13 38 Fed. Reg. 30960 (1973). The Act required that emissions of HC and CO from 
1975 model year automobiles be reduced to I 0% of their 1970 model year levels. 42 
U.S.C. § 1857F-l(b)(1)(A) (1970). The reductions from this program credited to emis-
sion reductions in Boston in calculating the further reductions needed there to achieve 
standards, however, is questionable in view of subsequent deferral of the fmal date for 
compliance by automobile manufacturers with these requirements and greater experi-
ence with the operating results of the control technology currently in use on au-
tomobiles. EPA granted a one-year suspension of the 1975 standards for HC and CO 
on Apr. 23, 1973. 38 Fed. Reg. 10317 (1973). And Congress, in§ 5 of the Energy Sup-
ply and Environmental Control Act, Pub. L. No. 93-319, 88 Stat. 246 (1974), suspended 
them for another two years. 
14 For a description of the HC control strategy contained in the original state im-
plementation plans, see 1972 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law§ 21.4, at 584. 
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The restrictions affect three types of sources: retail gasoline outlets, 
users of organic solvents, and sellers and users of paints and other ar-
chitectural coatings. 
Retail gasoline outlets are required to install a variety of vapor con-
trol and recovery devices designed to prevent the. evaporation of pe-
troleum products (and hence of HC) during trans~er operations, both 
from delivery vehicles to storage tanks and froth storage tanks to 
automobiles. 15 The TCP establishes a compliance schedule for the in-
stallation of these devices by March 1, 1976 or earlier. 16 
Emission limitations are established on the amount of HC that may 
be emitted by users of organic solvents, i.e., solvents containing vol-
atile HC. 17 Although no control technology is specified, the limitations 
can normally be met either by reformulating the solvent to eliminate 
its volatile organic component or by installing control devices, such as 
afterburners. The regulations establish a schedule for compliance with 
the limitations by May 31, 1975.18 Of the known sources of HC emis-
sions covered by this regulation, all but seven are presently operating 
in conformity with that compliance schedule. The remaining seven 
are under order by EPA to comply with the regulation. 19 
Finally, the use or sale of paint or other architectural coatings con-
taining a photochemically reactive solvent in containers of one quart 
or greater capacity is forbidden after January 1, 19'75.20 
These controls account for a great deal of the HC emission reduc-
tions the TCP set out to achieve in the Boston AQCR, far more than 
accounted for by the more socially disruptive transportation 
controls. 21 The vapor recovery requirements relating to retail gasoline 
outlets have the further advantage of being energy conservation 
measures. The fuel they save from evaporating a(:tually pays for the 
control devices over a fairly short period of time. In additiOn, they are 
relatively easy to enforce, since EPA already has a monitoring and 
surveillance program to assure compliance by retail gasoline outlets 
with unleaded gasoline requirements. 22 These factors are particularly 
noteworthy in view of growing scientific concern that smog is not just 
the product of local pollutants, but may be caused in part by pollut-
15 40 C.F.R. § 52.1144 (1974), 38 Fed. Reg. 30969 (1973). 
16 40 C.F.R. § 52.1147 (1974), 38 Fed. Reg. 30970 (1973), as amended, 39 Fed. Reg. 
4881,41252 (1974). 
17 40 C.F.R. § 52.1145 (1974), 38 Fed. Reg. 30969 (1973). AM see proposed amend-
ments to the regulation, 41 Fed. Reg. 8677 (1975). 1 
18 40 C.F.R. § 52.ll47 (1974), 38 Fed. Reg. 30970 (1973). But note the exception 
provision in 40 C.F.R. § 52.1147(c) (1974). 
19 Data submitted by EPA's Region I Enforcement Division. 
20 40 C.F.R. § 52.1146 (1974), 38 Fed. Reg. 30970 (1973). . 
21 See generally 38 Fed. Reg. 30962-63 (1973) (emission red\lctions expected for the 
various controls). 
22 40 C.F.R. Part 80 (1974). See also EPA, Region I press release, Dec. 17, 1974. 
44
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1974 [1974], Art. 21
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1974/iss1/21
§ 18.14 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 479 
ants transported by air currents from relatively distant locations. 23 If 
this "transport" theory proves to be valid and the amount of pollut-
ants transported to and from various locations can be quantified, the 
thrust of TCPs may have to be reexamined. If Boston's smog results 
from HC generated in Boston, Connecticut and New York, it makes 
sense to reduce Boston's smog by controls on HC emissions in all 
three locations. Indeed, it may be impossible to reduce smog suffi-
ciently to meet the national standards in some areas on the East Coast 
without controls on HC emissions over a much broader area. Since 
emission limitations on stationary sources are relatively more effective 
in reducing HC emissions than limitations on mobile or indirect 
sources and are relatively easier to enforce, the next decade may see 
the widespread application of HC emission limitations on a broad va-
riety of stationary sources throughout the East Coast urban corridor. 
This will not undercut the necessity of retaining VMT reduction 
strategies in some urban areas to address CO problems, since CO is 
very unstable and does not travel. But the extent and content of TCPs 
could conceivably be altered as HC controls on stationary sources be-
come widespread. 
In regard to the requirements relating to the installation and 
maintenance of pollution control devices on motor vehicles, it should 
be remembered that the Act required increasingly more stringent con-
trols be installed in new motor vehicles by their manufacturers, lead-
ing to a 90% reduction in HC and CO emissions from 1975 model 
year cars as compared to 1970 model year cars.24 For the cumulative 
reduction in pollutant emission expected from these controls to be 
fully realized, however, an inspection and maintenance program is 
necessary to detect and cure mechanical malfunctions, deterioration, 
and deliberate tampering.25 Indeed, Congress recognized this in spe-
cifically providing in the Act a requirement that state implementation 
plans contain inspection and maintenance programs to the extent 
necessary to enforce applicable emission standards. 26 Since EPA 
counted heavily on the success of these controls for much of the HC 
and CO emission reduction needed in the Boston AQCR,27 it required 
in the TCP that Massachusetts establish an inspection and mainte-
nance program by August 1, 1976. The TCP contemplated a program 
23 3 National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, Air Quality 
and Automobile Emission Control 76-90 (1974) (Senate Comm. on Pub. Works, Serial 
No. 93-24). Indeed, EPA appears to be acting in unstated accordance with this theory 
in its newly proposed amendments to the Boston TCP. See 41 Fed. Reg. 8668 (1975). 
24 See note 13 supra & accompanying text. 
25 Indeed, random sampling recently done by EPA reveals that in the absence of an 
effective inspection and maintenance program, those problems are more significant 
than EPA originally believed. 
26 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(C) (1970). 
27 38 Fed. Reg. 30960 (1973). 
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requiring inspection of all motor vehicles registered in the Boston 
AQCR twice a year to determine that they meet emission standards 
and forbidding their registration after that date in the event that they 
did not pass such inspections.28 The Registry of Motor Vehicles is 
currently planning and implementing a program to meet these re-
quirements in a manner compatible with the Commonwealth's existing 
safety inspection program.29 Some of the factors di~cussed in the im-
mediately preceding paragraph may lead to the imposition of such 
programs over a much larger area during the next several years. 
Since the Act did not require the whole range of sophisticated pol-
lution controls on pre-197 5 model vehicles, further emission reduc-
tions are possible by requiring some or all of those controls on such 
earlier vehicles. The TCP requires vacuum spark disconnect devices, 
air bleed control devices, and oxidizing catalysts on all light duty and 
some medium duty motor vehicles registered in the Boston AQCR. 
The dates by which the devices are to be installed and the vehicles on 
which they are to be installed differ. But no affectttd vehicle is to be 
used or registered after the designated dates unless equipped with the 
requisite control equipment.30 These requirements have been criti-
cized as not cost effective in that the vehicles involved, being older 
model year vehicles, will be retired from the active vehicle fleet in 
short order in any event. Moreover, since older vehicles tend to be 
owned by the less affluent, the cost of compliance~ tends to fall dis-
proportionately on those least able to pay. EPA has acknowledged 
this31 and has made it known that it would not enforce the require-
ment relating to oxidizing catalysts, the most expensive of the retrofit 
devices.32 Indeed, EPA has not taken steps to date to enforce the 
other retrofit requirements. 
The remaining Boston TCP strategies are aimed at reducing VMT, 
thereby reducing both HC and CO emissions. The strategies are both 
disincentives to driving in single passenger motor vehicles and incen-
tives to use other modes of transportation. The disincentives include 
an on-street parking ban; restrictions on the construction of new 
commercial parking facilities; an enforced vacancy 11ate during morn-
ing commuting hours in commercial parking facilities; reductions in 
parking spaces provided by employers for commuting employees; and 
28 40 C.F.R. § 52.1140 (1974), 38 Fed. Reg. 30967-68 (1973). 
29 Letter from Richard E. McLaughlin, Secretary of Public Safety, to John A.S. 
McGiennon, Regional Administrator, EPA, Region I, Nov. 1, 1974!. 
30 The latest such date is May 31, 1977.40 C.F.R. § 52.1141-4~ (1974), 38 Fed. Reg. 
30968-69 (1973). EPA presently proposes to defer all retrofit dates as long as possible. 
41 Fed. Reg. 8677-78 (1975). 
31 38 Fed. Reg. 17796 (1973). 
32 Address by EPA Administrator Russell Train, U.S. Conference of Mayors, San 
Diego, California, june 26, 1974. Current Developments, Environ; Rep., June 28, 1974, 
at 243. 
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surcharges on commercial parking fees and tunnel tolls. The incen-
tives include a state run carpool matching program, carpool/bus lane 
preference on some major arteries, and an augmentation of mass 
transit financing by surcharges collected. 
An on-street parking ban is imposed in central parts of Boston and 
CaJ?lbridge between 7 a.m. and 10 a.m. on workdays after March 1, 
1975. Residents of the area are allowed to park within one half mile 
of their residences. The ban is to be instituted by the Commonwealth 
and the political subdivisions having jurisdiction over the streets and 
roads in the affected area.33 The apparent lack of success of Boston 
and Cambridge in enforcing their extsting parking and traffic regula-
tions leaves some question as to how successful these measures will 
prove to be in fact. 
The TCP prohibits the construction of new commercial parking 
facilities in the same area if they would result in an increase in the 
parking spaces available in commercial parking facilities in that area 
over those available on October 15, 1973 (a slight increase in that 
number of spaces is allowed to reflect facilities in construction as of 
that date). Nor can any such facility be constructed without a permit 
from EPA or its designee. The permit cannot issue unless the permit-
ting authority is satisfied that the proposed facility will not increase 
parking spaces beyond the prescribed amount and will not interfere 
with the attainment or maintenance of air quality standards. 
The permit cannot be issued without public notice and opportunity 
for a hearing. Congress has subsequently evidenced its displeasure at 
such measures, requiring EPA to submit to it a study as to their neces-
sity and "authorizing" EPA to suspend their effective date until 
January 1, 197 5. 34 This regulation is not to be confused with similar 
regulation of parking facilities under the generally applicable indirect 
source regulations, discussed infra. The TCP also requires a reduction 
by March 1, 1975 of 40% in the total available parking spaces at 
commercial parking facilities in the Boston core area between 7 and 
10 a.m. on workdays from the total amount of such spaces available 
on October 15, 1973. The city of Boston may designate the percent-
age reduction for particular facilities as long as the total reductions 
add up to the required 40%.35 The TCP originally provided for a 
surcharge on commercial off-street parking spaces in that area and at 
Logan Airport, the proceeds to fund the MBTA,36 but this provision 
33 40 C.F.R. § 52.1134 (1974), 38 Fed. Reg. 30964 (1973). EPA presently proposed to 
defer the full implementation of on-street parking bans in Boston until Mar. I, 1977. 
41 Fed. Reg. 8675 (1975). 
34 40 C.F.R. § 52.1135(c) (1974), 38 Fed. Reg. 30965 (1973). ESECA § 4, codified at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-5(c)(2)(A) & (C). 
35 40 C.F.R. § 52.1136 (1974), 38 Fed. Reg. 30966 (1973). EPA proposes to revoke 
this requirement. 41 Fed. Reg. 8676 (1975). 
36 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.1136(b)-(d) (1974), 38 Fed. Reg. 30966 (1973). 
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was later withdrawn by EPA. 37 A similar provision for an egress toll 
from Logan Airport was also withdrawn. 38 
Among the most controversial of the measures fOntained in the 
TCP is that requiring a reduction of 25% in the number of employee 
parking spaces provided by each employer of 50 or fi?Ore in the Bos-
ton AQCR from the amount of such spaces proviped by that em-
ployer on October 15, 1973.39 The measure required the filing of ac-
tion plans by affected employers by July 31, 1974, indicating how they 
would achieve the reduction, prevent overflow parking, and assist 
their employees in finding means of commuter transportation other 
than single passenger motor vehicles.40 As of Augus~ 1974, a substan-
tial number of employers subject to the regulation h~d not filed such 
action plans. After public warning that formal actiol!l would be taken 
against those not in compliance with the regulation, EPA initiated 
administrative action against 393 such employers :by issuing them 
notices of violation, the first step in its enforcement procedures under 
the ActY As of this writing, action plans have been :filed by 1135 em-
ployers, including substantially all of the employers, to whom notices 
of violation were issued. 42 
One of the criticisms of the regulation is that it allows no leeway for 
employers in particularly unfavorable situations, e.g., isolated from 
mass transit with employees from sufficiently divergent directions to 
make carpooling impractical. EPA has indicated that it would adminis-
ter the regulation in a manner that would take such situations into ac-
count, and that it would eventually propose an amendment adding a 
hardship section to the regulation to provide relief i~ such cases.43 It 
appears from subsequent announcements that EPA, may couple this 
seeming relaxation in the requirements of the regulation with an ex-
pansion of the scope of the regulation to require 'the reduction in 
parking spaces provided to students by educational institutions and to 
37 39 Fed. Reg. 1849 (1974). The proposed Energy Emergency Act reported out of 
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on Dec. 10, 1973, contained a 
provision forbidding the imposition of such surcharges without prior congressional ap-
proval. Although the Act was not passed, for unrelated reasons, EPA took the provision 
as firm congressional guidance on the issue. Congress definitely Jllled out parking sur-
charges or taxes in § 4 of the Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 
1974, codified at 42 U.S.C. § l857c-5(c)(2)(B), although it did llSk EPA to submit a 
study on the necessity of parking surcharges. Id. § l857c-5(c)(2)(A~. 
38 40 C.F.R. § 52.1137 (1974), 38 Fed. Reg. 30966 (1973). For the revocation, see 39 
Fed. Reg. 1843 (1974). The reasons for revocation are the same as set forth in note 37 
sursra. . 
9 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.ll35(g)-(l) (1974), 38 Fed. Reg. 30965-66 (19!73). 
4o Id. 
41 EPA press release, August 13, 1974. For a description of EPA's enforcement pro-
cedures and remedies, see 42 U.S.C. § l857c-8 (1974); Miller, Environmental Law, 1972 
Ann. Surv. Mass. Law§ 21.6, at 597. 
42 Data supplied by EPA's Region I Air Branch. 
43 Quincy Patriot Ledger, June 14, 1974, at 3, col. 2; see also Boston Globe, Sept. 7, 
1974, at I, col. 4. See also South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.~d 646, 659, 6 E.R.C. 
2025 (lst Cir. 1974). 
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require employers and educational institutions not supplying parking 
spaces to develop, submit to EPA, and implement action plans to re-
duce the dependence of their employees and students on commuting 
by single passenger motor vehicles by 25%.44 
To assist affected employees to commute by carpool or mass transit, 
the TCP required the Commonwealth to establish a computerized 
carpool matching system (in the absence of a comparable privately 
operated system) capable of identifying and servicing employees af-
fected by the TCP employee parking space limitations. 45 It also re-
quired the Commonwealth to establish exclusive carpool/bus lanes on 
Interstate 93 during peak commuter hours and to study the feasibility 
of establishing programs to favor carpools and buses on other major 
arteries. 46 
The controversy over the Boston TCP is focused primarily on the 
strategies designed to reduce automobile use. The controversy would 
in all likelihood be less intense if the TCP also provided for alternate 
modes of transportation, such as the expansion of mass transit, which 
would reduce dependence on the automobile. The long lead time in-
volved in mass transit expansion, however, makes it unlikely that such 
measures could be implemented in time to meet the statutory attain-
ment date for the air quality standards. Mass transit expansion by the 
purchase of more buses is an exception. Even this exception is un-
available, however, under EPA's interpretation of its powers under 
the ActY Although not fully articulated, EPA's position appears to be 
that its regulatory jurisdiction under the Act is limited to requiring di-
rect or indirect sources of air pollution to reduce emissions. All of the 
strategies in the TCP can be justified on this basis. The inspection and 
maintenance regulation, for instance, requires the state, as the owner 
of str.eets and highways within the Boston AQCR (indirect sources), to 
reduce emissions from those sources by refusing access to them by au-
tomobiles registered in the area without properly maintained air pol-
lution control devices. EPA would contend that mandating mass 
transit improvements or expansion, however beneficial in reducing air 
44 Boston Globe, Oct. I, 1974, at I, col. I. Indeed, EPA presently proposes to aban-
don its parking space reduction strategy in favor of requirements that employers and 
schools reduce the number of their single passenger commuters by 25% regardless of 
whether they supply parking. This would be coupled with a variance provision. 41 Fed. 
Reg. 8679-80 (1975). 
45 40 C.F.R. § 52.1138 (1974), 38 Fed. Reg. 30966-67 (1973). For proposed amend-
ments, see 41 Fed. Reg. 8675-78 (1975). 
46 40 C.F.R. § 52.1139 (1974), 38 Fed. Reg. 30967 (1973). For proposed amendments, 
see 41 Fed. Reg. 8676 (1975). Strangely enough Congress has expressed mild displeas-
ure even with these mild, seemingly beneficial measures, requiring EPA to submit a 
study on their necessity and to hold public hearings in the area affected before impos-
ing them. ESECA § 4, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-5(c)(2)(A) & (E). 
47 EPA Office of General Counsel, Memorandum of Law regarding Legal Authority 
to Promulgate and Enforce Transportation Controls (Feb. 28, 1973). 
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pollution, cannot be conveniently structured as a requirement that the 
owner or operator of an air pollution source take steps to reduce 
emissions from that source. But it would appear thiat a provision re-
quiring the state to reduce emissions by providing alternative means 
of transportation could be structured consistently with EPA's existing 
regulations. EPA's interpretation appears to be a rather conservative 
view of its broad statutory mandate. The Act required state im-
plementation plans to include: "emission limitations, schedules, and 
timetables for compliance with such limitations, and such other measures 
as may be necessary to insure attainment and maintenanc~ of such primary or 
secondary standards, including, but not limited to land-use and transporta-
tion controls."48 There is nothing in the section suggesting that land 
use or transportation controls were limited to controls on emission 
sources. Even if there were, the italicized languag~ above would ap-
pear to be broad enough to justify requiring mass transit improve-
ment or expansion. 
The Springfield TCP is far more simple and less controversial than 
the Boston TCP. It consists of an on-street parking ban between 7 
and 10 a.m. on workdays in downtown Springfieldj 49 a surcharge on 
commercial parking fees (since withdrawn); 50 a requirement that the 
state establish a computerized carpool matching program; 51 regula-
tions for traffic flow improvement in the downtown area; 5 2 the closing 
of a portion of Main Street;53 and a requirement that the state estab-
lish an inspection and maintenance program designed to assure the 
maintenance of au to mobile air pollution control devices. 54 Most of 
these strategies are similar to comparable requirements contained in 
the Boston TCP. 
The Boston TCP was challenged in the First Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in suits filed by nine petitioners that were eventually consoli-
dated in South Terminal Corp. v. EPA. 55 These suits were but a small 
portion of nearly three hundred filed to challeng~ TCPs across the 
country.56 As of the time this article was written, decisions had been 
rendered on these cases in the First, Second, Third and Fifth Cir-
48 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(B) (1970) (emphasis added). Indeed, the Senate Commit-
tee on Public Works indicated that it realized "some regions may have to establish new 
transportation programs and systems." S. Rep. No. 91-1196, ~1st Cong. 2d Sess. 13 
(1973). 
49 40 C.F.R. § 52.1149 (1974), 38 Fed. Reg. 30830 (1973). 
50 40 C.F.R. § 52.1150 (1974), 38 Fed. Reg. 30830 (1973), withdrawn, 39 Fed. Reg. 
1849 (1974). See note 37 supra. 
51 40C.F.R. § 52.1151 (1974), 38 Fed. Reg. 30830-31 (1973). 
52 40 C.F.R. § 52.1152 (1974), 38 Fed. Reg. 30831 (1973). 
53 40 C.F.R. § 52.1153 (1974), 38 Fed. Reg. 30831 (1973). 
54 40 C.F.R. § 52.1154 (1974), 38 Fed. Reg. 30831 (1973). 
55 504 F.2d 646, 6 E.R.C. 2025 (1st Cir. 1974). 
56 Bracken, supra note 1, at 756. 
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cuits. 57 In all cases EPA's power to promulgate TCPs was upheld, al-
though its technical data or conclusions were questioned in some 
instances. 58 
The petitioners in the South Terminal case raised a variety of con-
stitutional, procedural and technical issues. The court found little 
merit in most of them. 59 
The most interesting procedural argument raised by the petitioners 
was that the public notice of the proposed TCP was insufficient under 
the Administrative Procedure Act. 60 This contention was based on the 
fact that the TCP as finally promulgated differed substantially from 
that originally proposed in the public notice in the Federal Register, 
57 Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246, 6 E.R.C. 1769 (3d Cir. 1974); Friends of the 
Earth v. EPA, 499 F.2d 1118,6 E.R.C. 1731 (2d Cir. 1974); Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390, 6 E.R.C. 1248 (5th Cir. 1974). 
58 Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246, 6 E.R.C. 1769 (3d Cir. 1974), was perhaps the 
most significant of these opinions. The court in that case held that EPA could promul-
gate and enforce a TCP requiring a state to enforce substantive measures set forth in 
the TCP. 500 F.2d at 263. Both South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 6 E.R.C. 
2025 (lst Cir. 1974), and Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d 
390, 6 E.R.C. 1248 (5th Cir. 1974), remanded technical issues to EPA for reconsidera-
tion. 
59 These contentions included: hearings held on the TCP prior to its promulgation 
should have been adjudicatory rather than legislative; an environmental impact state-
ment should have been prepared pursuant to 42 U .S.C. § 4332(2)(C) ( 1970); EPA 
lacked statutory authority to promulgate regulations affecting off-street parking; some 
aspects of the parking management regulations were arbitrary and capricious; the Act 
was an unconstitutional delegation of authority to EPA; various of the regulations oper-
ated in an ex post facto manner; and the commerce power did not confer jurisdiction 
on the federal government to regulate local traffic. The court was concerned that the 
restrictions on employee parking spaces could operate in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner in particular instances, but provisionally approved them subject to the de-
velopment of a variance provision that EPA represented in open court that it was de-
veloping. 504 F.2d at 682. It should be noted that such a variance provision is an un-
usual feature in regulations promulgated under the Act. In most instances, the formal 
process outlined in 42 U.S.C. § l857c-5(f) (1970) must be followed to secure hardship 
relief from such regulatory requirements. Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 
473 F.2d 875, 5 E.R.C. 1879 (lst Cir. 1973). But that section applies only to state im-
plementation plans affecting stationary or mobile sources. Parking facilities and other 
indirect sources do not fall into those two categories and can therefore be subject to less 
restrictive hardship exception provisions. 
Finally, some of the petitioners attacked the regulation requiring control of the evap-
oration of hydrocarbons at retail gasoline outlets, contending that the required control 
technology was not commercially available. As noted above, EPA acknowledged confu-
sion regarding this matter and promulgated a deferral of installation date for such de-
vices in the Boston and other TCPs, requesting further comment on the devices in-
volved, their efficiency and availability. In view of this, the court deferred further con-
sideration of the matter until EPA had completed reinvestigating the availability of the 
required control technology. 504 F.2d at 682. 
60 5 u.s.c. § 553(b)(3) (1970). 
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with no intervening notice being given of the changes. 61 EPA had in-
dicated in the public notice, however, that in the event that the meas-
ures proposed were insufficient to achieve air quality standards or 
were not preferable to other measures in light of public comments re-
ceived, EPA was considering other measures, which it listed. 62 The 
changes that occurred in the TCP between its proposal and final 
promulgation were a result of such comments received at hearings 
and in response to the public notice and flowed fr~m the other meas-
ures alluded to by EPA in its proposal. Under these circumstances, 
the court held that the purposes of the public notice requirements 
had been well served and that ultimately "the plan seems a logical 
outgrowth of the hearing and related procedures."63 
More serious was the petitioners' attack on the data base utilized by 
EPA in determining the extent of pollution reduction required to be 
achieved by the TCP to meet air quality standards. Since those stan-
dards provide limits that are not to be exceeded ' more than once a 
year,64 the pollution reduction required to be achieved by the TCP is 
the difference between the second highest recorded levels for the af-
fected pollutants and the standards established for those pollutants. 
The petitioners contended that the second highe~t readings for CO 
and HC were invalid for various technical reasons. The court found 
that the record was insufficient to demonstrate that EPA had ade-
-quately taken into account the technical objections raised by the 
petitioners. In fairness to EPA, the court noted that the petitioners 
had not raised the objections prior to their court challenge. Although 
under normal circumstances this might preclude the petitioners from 
raising the objections in the first instance on review, the TCP had 
such far reaching implications that the court determined that the ob-
jections nevertheless should be considered. At the same time, how-
ever, the court did not view itself as qualified to make determinations 
of the nature indicated and remanded the matter Ito EPA for further 
consideration. The court stayed final compliance with some of the 
controls contained in the TCP (although it did not stay interim plan-
61 38 Fed. Reg. 17689 (1973). The VMT-reduction strategies contained in the original 
proposal included an on-street parking ban in the Boston core area, a $5 maximum 
daily surcharge on off-street parking during business hours in tjhe Boston core area and 
at Logan Airport; and a prohibition against using motor vehidles registered within the 
Rte. 128 perimeter one day out of five during periods of high pollution levels. 
62 38 Fed. Reg. 376 (1973). 
63 504 F.2d at 659, 6 E.R.C. at 2030. Indeed, a contrary holding would be a great dis-
inc::entive against agencies taking public comments seriously. ilf proposed regulations 
had to be reproposed to incorporate changes suggested by public comment during pub-
lic comment periods, regulations might never be finalized, bJ,It caught in a perpetual 
limbo of being constantly reproposed to incorporate new changes suggested by public 
comments after successive reproposals. 
64 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.8, 50.9 (1974). 
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ning requirements contained in those controls). The court ordered 
EPA to hold additional public hearings within 60 days (by December 
26, 1974) on its technical data base to resolve the questions raised by 
the petitioners and thereafter to affirm or modify its determinations 
of the emission reductions required to be achieved by the TCP. The 
court also ordered EPA to amend the TCP to provide for its periodic 
updating in response to changing pollutant emissions. 65 EPA secured 
a 60-day extension of the time limits contained in the order to enable 
it to secure and evaluate new data collected after the promulgation of 
the TCP. Thus, as of this writing, the ultimate fate of the TCP is still 
in the hands of the court although there are preliminary indications 
that the new data evaluated by EPA will sustain the TCP without sig-
nificant modifications. 66 
The last word on the VMT reduction strategies affecting parking, 
however, may rest with Congress. In section 510 of EPA's fiscal 1975 
appropriation bill, Congress provided that: "No part of any funds ap-
propriated under this Act may be used by the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency to administer any program to tax, limit, or otherwise 
regulate parking facilities." 67 This provision does not remove the 
parking space related VMT reduction strategies from TCPs. It does 
not prevent states from administering such strategies. It does not pre-
vent EPA from administering them after June 30, 1975, the end of 
the 1975 fiscal year. But the possibility of the provision's renewal in 
subsequent years casts doubt on the feasibility of such strategies in an 
EPA-administered· TCP. Moreover, EPA may take the measure as 
congressional guidance on the matter, even if it is not renewed in fu-
ture years.68 Of course, if the Boston TCP is unable to achieve the air 
quality standards without implementing these strategies, more drastic 
or disruptive measures may eventually have to be imposed. 
§18.15. Maintenance strategies. EPA's approval of the State Im-
plementation Plans (SIPs) for all states was challenged in Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA 1 insofar as the SIPs did not provide 
for the maintenance of air quality standards once they were attained. 
65 504 F.2d at 681-82, 6 E.R.C. at 2046-47. The regulations stayed were 40 C.F.R. §§ 
52.1135, 52.1136 & 52.1144 (1974). 
66 EPA's recently proposed amendments to the Boston TCP do not represent a re-
treat from the existing TCP, although they do create a more workable structure. The 
technical support for the proposed amendments indicates that although the data under-
lying the original TCP may have been unverifiable technically, more refined data con-
firms the original estimate of the pollution problem and the consequent control needs. 
41 Fed. Reg. 8668 et seq. (1975). 
67 Section 510 of the Agriculture-Environmental and Consumer Protection Appropri-
ation Act, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-563, § 510, 88 Stat. 1822 (Dec. 31, 1974). 
68 EPA has done this before. See note 37 supra & accompanying text. 
§18.15. 1 475 F.2d 968,6 E.R.C. 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
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The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled in 
1973 that the record was insufficient to determine whether the SIPs 
adequately provided for maintenance of standards. The court ordered 
EPA to review the SIPs and disapprove those which contained inade-
quate analysis of and provisions for the control of maintenance prob-
lems. Upon review, EPA determined that no SIP adequately dealt 
with maintenance and accordingly disapproved all SIPs to that 
extent. 2 
EPA then began to develop a strategy to assure maintenance of 
standards. It began with several aspects of the existing control scheme 
that indirectly limited the effects of growth on air quality. 3 One of 
these was a requirement that the SIPs provide for the prior review of 
new sources of air pollution and the prevention of their construction 
to the extent they would jeopardize the attainment ,or maintenance of 
air quality standards. 4 The Massachusetts SIP contains such a 
provision.5 Such measures, however, address only direct sources of air 
pollution and are of little use in providing for maintenance of stan-
dards for CO, HC and smog, which are primarily emitted from 
automobiles. 6 EPA accordingly rounded out this measure by requiring 
that SIPs provide for the prior review of construction that would in-
crease automobile traffic and the prevention of such construction to 
the extent that the increased traffic would jeopardize the attainment 
or maintenance of air quality standards. This measure is known as in-
direct source review and is discussed below in detail. 7 
But even these combined measures only require source by source 
review of large sources. As such, they are tools to analyze and control 
only a portion of a region's air quality maintenance prpblems. Accord-
ingly, EPA has also required SIPs to provide strategies to deal with 
maintenance in a more comprehensive manner. It required the states 
to identify areas in which current air quality or projected growth may 
cause air quality standard violations within the next 10 years. 8 Mas-
sachusetts has identified metropolitan LawrencdHaverhill, Boston, 
2 38 Fed. Reg. 6279 (1973). 
3 These included: (l) the requirement that SIPs contain procedures for review of new 
sources of air pollution and for the prevention of the constn~ction of such sources if 
their emissions would prevent the attainment or maintenance :of air quality standards, 
40 C.F.R. § 51.18 (1974); (2) emission limitations on new sources promulgated pursuant 
to 42 U.S.C. § l857c-6 (1970) (see 40 C.F.R. Part 60 (1974) ); (3) emission limitations on 
new automobiles promulgated pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § l857f-l (1970) (see § 18.14 at 
note 13 supra); and (4) the inference of 42 U.S.C. § l857c-5 (1970) that EPA requires 
' the revision of SIPs if monitoring data subsequently demonstr~tes that they are inade-
quate to attain or maintain air quality standards. 
4 40 C.F.R. § 51.18 (1974). 
5 Dep't of Pub. Health, Bureau of Air Quality Control, Regulation 2. 
6 See§ 18.14 n.4 supra. _ 
7 40 C.F.R. § 51.22 (1974). 
8 Id. § 5l.l2(e). 
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Worcester and Springfield as such areas and EPA plans to formally 
designate each as an air quality maintenance area (AQMA) in the near 
future. 9 Each state with an AQMA is required by June 18, 1975 to 
develop and submit to EPA an analysis of the impact of growth on air 
quality in the AQMA and such amendments to the SIPs as may be 
necessary to maintain air quality standards in the AQMA ("air quality 
maintenance plans"). 10 It is likely that the submission date for these 
plans may be deferred for one year in recognition of their great com-
plexity. The process is dynamic and must be repeated every 5 years.U 
EPA's regulations do not indicate what types of measures should be 
incorporated into air quality maintenance plans. But non-binding 
guidelines suggest that adroit manipulation of traditional measures 
such as zoning codes might be appropriate to achieve controls on 
growth, if necessary. 12 If such measures were incorporated in the 
SIPs, they would, of course, become enforceable by EPA and private 
citizens, and amendments to them would not be possible without ap-
proval by EP A. 13 Such developments are by no means certain, but are 
possible. While the potential social and economic impact of such de-
velopments could dwarf that of the TCPs, they have received surpris-
ingly little public attention. This may be due in part to the expectation 
that if air quality maintenance plans interject EPA too far into tradi-
tionally local concerns, Congress will act to restrain it. 14 
The indirect source review procedures offer some indication of the 
controls that may be developed as maintenance measures. Among the 
contentions of the plaintiffs in Natural Resources Defense Council was 
that EPA's approval of the SIPs was invalid insofar as the SIPs did not 
provide for review of new construction that might affect CO, HC and 
smog standards by increasing automobile traffic. The court agreed. 15 
Acting pursuant to the resulting court order, EPA reviewed the SIPs, 
found them all deficient in that regard, and disapproved them to that 
extent. 16 EPA then amended its regulations to require that SIPs con-
tain provisions for prior review of new indirect as well as direct 
sources of air pollution; published guidelines to assist the state in 
9 Conversations with the Chief of EPA's Air Quality Planning Section. 
1o 40 C.F.R. § 51.12(g) (1974). 
11 Id. §§ 51.12(e)(3) & (g)(3). 
12 "Guidelines for Air Quality Maintenance Planning and Analysis," Volumes 1-12, 
EPA. 
13 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-5, 1857c-8, 1857h-2j (1970); Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 875, 5 E.R.C. 1879 (1st Cir. 1973). 
14 As Congress has indicated its displeasure with EPA's attempts to impose parking 
taxes and roadways tolls and has prevented EPA for a time from regulating parking 
facilities. See § 18.14 n.37 supra. 
15 475 F.2d at 970. 
16 38 Fed. Reg. 6290 (1973). 
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drafting such provisions; allowed the states until August 15, 1973 to 
submit indirect source review procedures to it for approval; and, fi-
nally, on February 25, 1974, promulgated indirect :source review pro-
cedures applicable in those states without approved procedures of 
their own. 17 Massachusetts did not do so and its S~P was accordingly 
disapproved to that extent. Since it has not subs¢quently submitted 
such procedures, the federal regulations apply. T~ose procedures re-
quire pre-construction approval by EPA of new pcltrking facilities for 
more than 1 ,000 cars or modified parking facilities! adding more than 
500 parking spaces in any standard metropolitan statistical area (2,000 
and 1 ,000 respectively outside any such area); moderate-sized air-
ports; and new or modified highway sections with high anticipated 
traffic volumes. 18 No construction of such indirect sources is supposed 
to commence after December 31, 1974 without approval by EPA. 19 
Construction of parking facilities cannot be approved if they would 
interfere with the attainment or maintenance of CO standards, and 
construction of airports and highways cannot be approved if they 
would interfere with the attainment or maintena:nce of any of the 
automobile-related standards. EPA's criteria for approving parking 
facilities include review of specified design details, such as the number 
and location of exits and entrances. 20 EPA may delegate its review 
and approval authority to state air pollution control agencies or other 
local agencies.U Massachusetts has requested such delegation. 
Congress in the Emergency Energy Bill passed by both houses in 
December 1973 would have authorized EPA to suspend these re-
quirements as they related to parking facilities un~il January 1, 1975. 
Although the bill did not become law (for unrelated reasons), EPA 
followed congressional ~uidance and suspended the implementation 
of those regulations unul that date.22 Subsequently, Congress prohib-
ited EPA from administering the regulations as they relate to park-
ing facilities until July 1, 1975.23 Whether Congress will act to perma-
nently remove EPA from jurisdiction over parking facilities remains to 
be seen. 
Insofar as both the TCPs and the indirect sour~e regulations con-
tain provisions concerning new parking facilities, they have inevitably 
caused confusion as to their respective applicability~ To clarify the po-
tential conflict, EPA explained that TCP management regulations 
generally take precedence over indirect source regulations in regard 
17 40 C.F.R. § 52.22 (1974). 
18 ld. § 52.22(b) (2). 
19 ld. § 52.22(b) (3). 
20 Id. § 52.22(b) (4) (ii). 
21 Id. § 52.22(b) (14). 
22 39 Fed. Reg. 1848 (1974). 
23 See § 18.14 n.37 supra. 
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to new parking facilities. 24 This delineation is logical in that the TCP 
parking management regulations are potentially the most restrictive of 
the two, requiring review of both HC and CO emissions rather than 
just of CO emissions, as is the case with indirect source regulations. 
Although EPA proposed to further integrate the two sets of reg-
ulations,25 it was interrupted in doing so by court action on the Bos-
ton TCP26 and the congressional action noted above27 and it has pro-
ceeded no further in this regard. 
§18.16. Non-degradation. EPA's approval of the State Im-
plementation Plans (SIPs) for all states was challenged in Sierra Club v. 
Ruckelshaus 1 insofar as EPA had not required the plans to prevent the 
deterioration of existing air quality. The United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia, on the basis of both the stated purpose 
of the Clean Air Act2 and its legislative history, held the state im-
plementation plans were invalid insofar as they allowed "pollution 
levels of clean air to rise to the secondary standard level of pol-
lution."3 It ordered EPA to disapprove the plans to that extent and to 
promulgate regulations to prevent such degradation. Its decision was 
utlimately affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court. 
EPA accordingly disapproved the offending plans to the extent di-
rected by the Court and published proposed sets of regulations to 
cure the deficiencies. 4 Since EPA felt that neither the Act nor the 
court order offered clear direction as to the type of regulatory scheme 
appropriate for preventing deterioration, its first proposal was in the 
unusual form of four alternative conceptual approaches, intended to 
focus discussion on conceptual issues. The proposed alternatives 
ranged from the establishment of a uniform incremental increase that 
would be allowed in pollution levels in any Air Quality Control Re-
24 40 C.F.R. § 5l.22(b)(l5) (1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 25292 (1974). Indirect source reg-
ulations continue to apply to all new residential parking facilities. however, since such 
facilities are generally exempt from control in TCPs (see, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 52.1135 
(1974)) but are not exempt in the indirect source regulations. 
25 See 39 Fed. Regs. 30442, 30451 (1974). 
26 See§ 18.14 n.55 supra. 
27 See §18.14 n.37 supra. 
§18.16. 1 344 F. Supp. 253, 4 E.R.C. 1205 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 40 U.S.L.W. 2811, 4 E.R.C. 
1815 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 412 U.S. 541, 5 E.R.C. 1417 
(1973). 
2 42 U.S.C. § 1857(b)(l) (1970). "To protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's 
air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and the productive capac-
ity of its population." Id. The Court indicated that "On its face, this language would 
appear to declare Congress' intent to improve the quality of the nation's air and to pre-
vent deterioration of that air quality, no matter how presently pure that quality in some 
sections of the country happens to be." 344 F. Supp. at 255, 4 E.R.C. at 1206. 
3 344 F. Supp. at 257, 4 E.R.C. at 1207. 
4 39 Fed. Reg. 31000 (1974); 38 Fed. Reg. 18986 (1973); 37 Fed. Reg. 23836 (1972). 
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gion (AQCR) over such levels as they existed in 1972, to the designa-
tion of three categories of zones with different incremental increases 
allowed in pollution levels for each category of zone. All of the alter-
natives had the potential to significantly impact future economic 
growth and understandably resulted in a considerable amount of pub-
lic comment. 5 The second set of proposed regulations was an elabora-
tion on the zone concept which was ultimately adopted in the final 
regulations promulgated on December 5, 1974.6 
Basically, the regulations create three zones, denominated Class I, 
Class II and Class III. In Class I areas very little degradation is al-
lowed in air quality from that existing during 1974 ~adjusted to reflect 
emissions from new sources approved prior to 1975 pursuant to new 
source review procedures in state implementation plans but not actu-
ally constructed prior to that time). 7 In Class II ar~as a moderate in-
crease in pollutant levels is allowed. 8 The incre~se would allow a 
reasonable amount of new industry, as long as it is well planned and 
controlled, not of unusual size and not clustered in a small area. It 
would, however, preclude the introduction of new major sources of 
air pollution, such as a 1000 megawatt fossil fuel power plant. 9 In 
Class III areas increases in pollution levels are allowed up to the levels 
of the national air quality standards. 10 
All areas are initially designated as Class II by E!PA.U States, how-
ever, may submit proposed redesignations in the class of any area to 
EPA for approval. 12 Approval is contingent on the state following 
specified public participation procedures, taking specified considera-
tions into account in proposing the redesignation, 13 and undertaking 
5 See 39 Fed. Reg. 31000 (1974). 
6 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 42510 (1974). 
7 For particulate matter, an increase of 5 g/m in the annual g~ometric mean and 10 
g/m in the 24 hour maximum. For sulfur dioxide, an increase df 2 g/m in the annual 
geometric mean, 5 g/m in the 24 hour maximum, and 3 g/m in the 3 hour maximum. 
40 C.F.R. § 52.21(c)(2)(i) (1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 42515 (1974). 
8 For particulate matter, an increase of 10 g/m in the annual gj::ometric mean and 30 
g/m in the 24 hour maximum. For sulfur dioxide, an increase o~ 15 g/m in the annual 
geometric mean, 100 g/m in the 24 hour maximum, and 700 in ithe 3 hour maximum. 
40 C.F.R. § 52.21(c)(2)(i) (1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 42515 (1974). 
9 See 39 Fed. Reg. 31004,42510 (1974). 
10 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(c)(2)(ii) (1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 42515 (1974). i 
11 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(c)(3)(i) (1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 42515 (1974).' 
12 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(c)(3)(ii) (1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 42515 (1974)., 
13 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(c)(3)(vi) (1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 42515 (1974):. States must consider: 
(1) anticipated growth; (2) social, economic and environmental effects of the proposed 
redesignation on the area and other areas and states; and (3) impacts on national or re-
gional interests. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(c)(3)(ii)(d) (1974), 39 Fed. Ref. 42515 (1974). Slight 
additional requirements and procedures are indicated when fede al or Indian lands are 
affected. 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.21(c)(3)(iii)-(v) (1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 425.5 (1974). 
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the new source reviews discussed below. 14 
The construction of new heavy industry anywhere is precluded 
until EPA or the state has determined that: (1) emissions from the 
new source would not violate the increment of allowed increase in air 
pollution for the area in which the source would be located or in ad-
jacent areas, and (2) the source will apply the best available technology 
to control emissions of particulate matter and sulfur dioxide. 15 Elabo-
rate public participation procedures are required to be followed in 
making such determinations by either EPA or a state. 16 
It will be interesting to see whether these regulations will stand the 
test of their inevitable court challenge. It could be argued that they 
are not as restrictive as the court's decision suggested they should 
beY They only prevent degradation of two pollutants, while EPA has 
set standards for six pollutants, and many other pollutants are con-
stantly emitted. This would not appear to be in accordance with the 
initial conclusion of the court in Sierra Club that the Act precluded 
EPA from approving SIPs that allowed "pollution levels of clean air to 
rise to the secondary level of pollution."18 Moreover, insofar as states 
reclassify areas as Class III, no protection against degradation has 
been added to the preexisting regulatory scheme since increases in 
pollution to the secondary standard level are allowed in Class III 
areas. Indeed, even the Class II designation allows what some might 
consider significant degradation. 19 
14 The requirement that a state undertake to do new source reviews prior to EPA's 
considering proposed redesignations of areas within the state, is a neat bureaucratic 
ploy by EPA that will be appreciated by students of environmental federalism. EPA has 
been relatively unsuccessful in persuading states to seek delegation of new source re-
view authority under its New Source Performance Standards. 40 C.F.R. Part 60 (1974). 
This has left the Agency open to suspicions that it is not encouraging full state in· 
volvement in implementing the Clean Air Act. Moreover, the necessity of EPA conduct-
ing new source reviews has been a drain on its resources. The anti-degradation new 
source reviews appear to subsume and be more extensive than the New Source Perfor-
mance Standards reviews and consequently to require the expenditure of greater re-
sources. Few states will be able to continue resisting accepting delegation of new source 
reviews, since such delegation is a prerequisite for EPA approval of reclassification of 
areas and reclassification of at least one area in every state to Class III appears to be 
necessary if the state is to experience any significant economic growth or even host a 
significant new power plant. 
15 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(d) (1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 42516 (1974). 
16 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(e) (1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 42516-17 (1974). 
17 A variety of objections to the regulations by both environmentalists and industry 
are mentioned in the prologue to the regulations. Some of these will undoubtedly be 
urged in arguments to the courts. 39 Fed. Reg. 42510-13 (1974). 
18 344 F. Supp. at 256, 4 E.R.C. at 1207. 
19 The whole concept of "significant" deterioration appears to be an artifice to avoid 
the full implications of the district court's opinion. The court nowhere suggested that 
significance be the touchstone of preventing degradation. But all of EPA's proposals 
have been in terms of significant degradation. It even entitled the prologues to the 
proposed and final regulations "Prevention of Significant Air Quality Deterioration." 
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Aside from the conceptual difficulties of establisning a strict anti-
degradation standard and the resources and data r¢quired to imple-
ment such a standard,20 it would impose constraints on economic 
growth that the present administration-or indeed 1any probable fu-
ture administration-would not be willing to accept. Thus it is impos-
sible for EPA to satisfy the environmentalists, the Oourt and the ad-
ministration on the degradation issue and it is unlikely that it could 
wholly satisfy any one of them. The only way 04t for EPA is an 
amendment in the Act giving it specific direction on the issue. The 
administration has, in fact, submitted an amendmenl to eliminate the 
requirement of preventing the significant detelrioration of air 
quality.21 In the absence of such an amendment, fur):her litigation ap-
pears inevitable. In the meantime, it is also likely that Massachusetts 
will seek to classify some areas as Class III and, as a precondition to 
such reclassification, will agree to assume new source review authority. 
§18.17. SIP revisions and variances. State Implementation Plans 
(SIPs) may be revised from time to time by the states, but revisions 
require EPA approval. 1 EPA will approve a revision only when a state 
demonstrates that the SIP, as revised, will achieve national air quality 
standards by its statutory attainment date and that various procedural 
and public participation requirements have been met. 2 
Massachusetts submitted a number of revisions to EPA for approval 
during 1974. The most noteworthy were chapters 353, 494 and 499 
of the Acts of 1974, submitted to EPA on August 9, 1974.3 
Chapter 353, passed over the Governor's veto, would allow the 
burning of residual fuel oil with a sulfur content of 2.2% in the Berk-
shire Air Quality Control Region (AQCR). In his su~mission of chap-
ter 353 to EPA, the Governor indicated his belief that fuel oil with a 
sulfur content higher than the 1% presently allowed4i could be burned 
in the Berkshire AQCR under certain conditions without jeopardizing 
the attainment and maintenance of air quality standards. He noted, 
See note 4 supra. Most of the previous administrative statements pn the issue quoted by 
the Court in support of its conclusion also made use of the term~ But it should be rec-
ognized that there is a conceptual difference between preventing air quality degrada-
tion and preventing significant air quality degradation. The bitter allows some and 
perhaps a considerable amount of new pollution and was arguabl~ not contemplated in 
the Court's opinion. : 
20 These difficulties are outlined in the prologues to both sets of proposed regula-
tions and to the final regulations. 
21 39 Fed. Reg. 42510 (1974). 
§18.17. 1 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(3)(A) (1970). But see Train v. /'latural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc., -U.S.-, 43 U.S.L.W. 4467 (April 16, 1975) (No. 73-1742). 
2 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.4, 51.6, 51.8 (1974). . 
3 By letters of that date from Governor Sargent to EPA's Regional Administrator in 
Boston, John McGlennon. 
4 Dep't of Pub. Health, Bureau of Air Quality Control, Reg. 5.1.2. 
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however, that chapter 353 allowed the burning of high sulfur fuel at 
all times, with no control. 5 During periods of atmospheric inversion 
this could result in standards violations. EPA has not yet officially 
acted upon this revision. It had, however, previously denied, in part, a 
one-year variance granted by the Department of Public Health (DPH) 
to one of the largest residual oil users in the Berkshire AQCR, ap-
proving the variance only during the six summer months. This may 
give some indication that EPA will not approve chapter 353 in its en-
tirety. 
Chapter 494 requires the DPH to periodically review and revise the 
Massachusetts SIP to minimize the economic cost of its requirements, 
while still achieving and maintaining national air quality standards. 
The DPH is currently undertaking the required review and has pre-
pared drafts of regulations raising the permitted sulfur content of 
fuel oil to 1% in metropolitan Boston and 2.2% elsewhere. The review 
dovetails with the requirement of the Energy Supply and Environ-
mental Coordination Act of 197 46 that EPA review all SIPs and report 
to the states whether the SIPs can be revised with respect to fuel 
burning sources without interfering with the attainment and mainte-
nance of national standards. This process will almost certainly result 
in raising somewhat the permitted sulfur content of fuels. Chapter 
494 would also require the DPH to defer the attainment of national 
standards for as long as permitted under the federal Clean Air Act. 
Further, it would require the DPH to correspondingly defer dates 
contained in regulations, compliance schedules, orders and other 
measures designed to achieve the standards upon petition from the 
owner or operator of an affected source. These requirements will in 
all probability have a minimal impact, since the attainment date for 
primary standards is established by the federal Act as May 31, 197 5. 7 
Chapter 494 further directs the DPH to allow sulfur oxide emission 
limitations to be met by tall stacks and fuel switching as well as by 
burning fuel with a low sulfur content. It should be noted that one 
court has ruled that EPA cannot approve a SIP containing tall stack 
5 Acts of 1974, c. 353. 
6 Incorporated at 42 U.S.C. §§ l857c-5(a)(3)(B) (1970). 
7 42 U.S.C. § l857c-5(a)(2)(A)(i) (1970) requires attainment of primary standards 
within 3 years of the approval of a SIP. The Massachusetts SIP was approved on May 
31, 1972. 37 Fed. Reg. 10872 (1972). This date can be extended for an AQCR, but only 
for a period of two years, if requested by the Governor in submitting the original SIP 
and on a showing that achievement of the standard is impossible within the three year 
period because the technology is not available to key sources of air pollution in the 
AQCR. 42 U.S.C. § l857c-5(e) (1970). Since the Governor made no such request in 
submitting the Massachusetts SIP and no technological deficiencies appear to be critical 
to attainment of primary standards in Massachusetts, the extension appears to be un-
available to it. 
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controls and that EPA, as a policy matter, supports constant emission 
limitations rather than fuel switching. 8 Tall stacks do not reduce pol-
luting emissions but merely disperse them. Fuel switching schemes 
may be well calculated to avoid violating short term standards but 
jeopardize the attainment of annual average st~ndards and are 
thought to be impossible to enforce with the resources available to 
control agencies. EPA has not taken final action with respect to this 
proposed revision and appears to be waiting to determine what im-
plementing actions the DPH intends to take to effeduate its purpose. 
Chapter 499 purported to exempt municipal indnerators operated 
by Weymouth, Winchester and Brookline from th~ requirements of 
the SIP. EPA has indicated that the revision is not approvable pres-
ently because the state has not supplied the documentation required 
to demonstrate compliance with EPA's substantive ~nd procedural re-
quirements for revision approval. More import<\ntly, it indicated 
doubt that the revision could be approved ev{fn if the missing 
documentation were supplied. It noted that the three incinerators are 
significant sources of particulate emissions in an AQCR where the 
primary standards for particulates have not been achieved and where 
the SIP must be supplemented by further measur¢s to maintain the 
standards once they are achieved. EPA indicated t~at the exemption 
of sources from a SIP in such an AQCR would be possible only if 
coupled with a corresponding addition of control over other sources 
not previously regulated or a corresponding increase in the controls 
over sources previously regulated. 9 Moreover, EPA subsequently is-
sued a notice of violation to Weymouth in regard to the operation of 
its incinerator, the first step in EPA's enforcement procedures. 10 
The possible disapproval or partial disapproval by EPA of these 
Acts raises interesting questions of environmental federalism. EPA 
cannot repeal state statutes. But it can disapprove all or part of a SIP, 
and if it does so it must thereafter promulgate regulations to substi-
tute for the disapproved portions of the SIP.U Wi~ regard to EPA's 
authority, the First Circuit has said: 
We hold that these statutory provisions not only empower, but 
also require, the Administrator to disapprove state statutes and 
regulations, or portions thereof, which are not in accordance with 
8 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390, 6 E.R.C. 1248 (5th 
Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 43 U.S.L.W. 4467 (U.S., April 16, 1975) (No. 
73-1742). Current Developments, Environ. Rep., Dec. 6, 1974, at 1232; Current De-
velopments, Environ. Rep., Jan. 25, 1974, at 1583-84. 
9 Letter of EPA's Regional Administrator in Boston, John A. $. McClennon, to Gov-
ernor Sargent, Dec. 26, 1974. · 
10 Miller, Environmental Law, 1972 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law§ 21.6, at 597. See also 42 
U.S.C. § 1857c-8 (1970). 
11 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-5(a)(2), (c) (1970). 
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the requirements of the Clean Air Act. . . . Congress plainly in-
tended the federal statute and regulations promulgated thereun-
der to take precedence over state laws and regulations. By en-
abling the Administrator to insert his own regulations in a state 
plan, it provided him with the needed authority to substitute 
appropriate provisions for inadequate ones. Thereafter, as equal 
components of the state plan, the Administrator's regulations may 
be both federally and locally enforced; violations thereof are viola-
tions of the state planY 
Disapproval (or partial disapproval) by EPA of any of the Acts in 
question, however, would not appear to require it to promulgate sub-
stituting regulations. The Acts purport to modify the existing, EPA 
approved, SIP. Revisions to the SIP require EPA approval. If EPA 
disapproves the Acts as revisions, the SIP continues in effect un-
changed, enforceable, under the First Circuit's rationale, both by EPA 
and the DPH. The Acts then would have been rendered meaningless 
by EPA. 
In 1973 in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 13 the First 
Circuit ordered EPA to disapprove the original Massachusetts SIP in-
sofar as its variance provisions authorized the DPH to grant variances 
to SIP requirements extending beyond the statutory attainment dates. 
The court agreed with EPA's contention that variances were revisions 
to the SIP and therefore required EPA's approval before becoming 
effective. But it held that the DPH could not grant, and EPA could 
not approve, a variance that extended beyond the statutory attain-
ment dates. 14 Such revisions could only be approved through the 
mechanism of 42 U.S.C. §1857c-5(f) (1970). As a practical matter this 
mechanism could only be available in a very limited number of cases 
for reasons discussed below .15 The court left to EPA discretion 
whether to permit variances terminating prior to the attainment dates. 
It also allowed mechanisms for providing short term flexibility during 
the post-attainment period to allow for mechanical breakdowns, acts 
of God, etc. 
EPA accordingly disapproved the Massachusetts variance provision 
12 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 875, 888, 5 E.R.C. 1879, 
1880 (1st Cir. 1973). Indeed, in discussing EPA's authority in the TCP area, the Third 
Circuit went so far as to indicate that EPA by its regulatory and enforcement powers 
could force a state to take positive legislative action to authorize, for instance, the state 
administration of an inspection and maintenance system to assure proper functioning 
of air pollution control devices on automobiles. Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246, 6 
E.R.C. 1769 (3d Cir. 1974). 
13 478 F.2d 875, 5 E.R.C. 1879 (1st Cir. 1973). See Miller, Environmental Law, 1972 
Ann. Surv. Mass. Law§ 21.2, at 578; see§ 18.14 n.6 supra. 
14 478 F.2d 875,5 E.R.C. 1879 (1st Cir. 1973). 
15 See text at note 27 infra. 
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and promulgated one in its place. Under EPA's regulation no variance 
to the requirements of the Massachusetts SIP can b~ granted unless it: 
(1) requires compliance as exJ?editiously as practicable but no later 
than the primary standard attamment dates if in a(l area where prim-
ary standards are still to be met; (2) requires compliance within a 
reasonable time but no later than the secondary standard attainment 
dates if in other areas; and (3) becomes effective only upon approval 
by EPA. EPA's approval is contingent upon publk participation pro-
cedures having been met. The procedures allow post-attainment date 
variances only through the mechanism of 42 Q.S.C. § 1857c-5(f) 
(1970) or for a maximum of three months where compliance is im-
possible because of breakdown or malfunction of equipment or act of 
God.l6 
In the period since the First Circuit handed dqwn its decision on 
variances, several other circuits have considered ; the question. The 
Eighth and Second Circuits generally agree with the First CircuitY 
The Fifth Circuit held that section 1857c-5(f) is the only mechanism 
for granting even pre-attainment date variances.18 And the Ninth Cir-
cuit has rejected the pre-attainment and post-attainment distinction, 
holding that states can grant minor variances at a~y time without re-
sort to section 1857c-5(f).19 At the time of this w~iting, the Supreme 
Court had granted certiorari to resolve this disagreement between the 
circuits. 20 In the meantime, following the view of the majority of the 
circuits, EPA disapproved all state SIPs to the extent that they allowed 
variances beyond the statutory attainment dates and proposed regula-
tions to cure this defect. 21 In the interest of pn~moting uniformity 
among the states, the proposed regulations woul~ supersede EPA's 
previously promulgated variance regulation in Massachusetts. The 
proposed regulation would prohibit a state variance, order or other 
measure deferring compliance with a SIP requirement beyond a 
16 40 C.F.R. § 52.1131 (1974). 
17 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 494 F.2d 1475, 6 E.R.C. 1475 (2d 
Cir. 1974); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 473 F.2d 690, 5 E.R.C. 
1917 (8th Cir. 1973). 
18 Natur;il Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390, 6 E.R.C. 1248 (5th 
Cir. 1974), rev'd, 43 U.S.L.W. 4467 (U.S., April16, 1975) (No. 73-1742). 
19 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 507 F.2d j905, 7 E.R.C. 1181 (9th 
Cir. 1974). · 
2° Current Developments, Environ. Rep., Jan. 17, 197 5, at 1430-31 ; Current De-
velopments, Environ. Rep., Jan. 10, 1975, at 1391-93. The Court recently reversed the 
Fifth Circuit case. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 43 U.S.L.W. 4467 
(U.S., April 16, 1975) (No. 73-1742). The Court ruled that st4tes may grant pre- and 
post-attainment variances without going through the proc~dures of 42 U .S.C. § 
1857c-5(f). It suggests that states may grant variances without IEPA approval if there-
sult would not interfere with the attainment or maintenance of air quality standards. It 
is too early to predict the impact of this decision on the implementation of the Act or 
the SIPs. 
21 39 Fed. Reg. 34572 (1974). 
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primary or secondary standard attainment date, except in conformity 
with actions taken pursuant to sections 1857c-5(e) or (f). EPA had not 
taken final action on this proposal as of the date this was written. 
The requirement that EPA approve variances before they become 
effective has undoubtedly had a chilling effect on those seeking var-
iances. DPH's regulations allow it to grant variances for no more than 
a year.22 But the time required for EPA to approve a variance may 
consume most or all of that year.23 This results in part from EPA's 
position that revision approval is a rule-making procedure and thus 
requires proposal in the Federal Register, public comment, and pro-
mulgation in the Federal Register. The greatest part of this delay, how-
ever, appears to result from the various levels of review required for 
approval in EPA's regional office, Washington headquarters, and the 
a1r pollution planning and standards facility in North Carolina. 
A related problem for EPA, states and air pollution sources is the 
legal status of sources not yet in compliance with SIP requirements on 
the statutory attainment date, May 31, 1975 in most cases. It is proba-
ble that many sources will be in that position because of ignorance of 
relevant SIP requirements, failure of control agencies to expeditiously 
approve control equipment designs, delays in equipment delivery, 
non-existence of required technology, and, in some cases, recalci-
trance. All sources not in compliance with SIP requirements on the at-
tainment date, regardless of the reason for their non-compliance, 
would appear to be in the same uncomfortable position: subject to 
criminal fines of up to $25,000 a day, imprisonment, and injunctive 
orders, including shut-down orders, that could result from suits in-
itiated by aggrieved citizens as well as state and federal control 
agencies.24 Control agencies seeking to stricdy interpret and enforce 
the Act and the SIPs would cause significant economic disruption in 
an already unsettled economy. Control agencies not doing so would 
be criticized by environmental groups for not carrying out their 
statutory mandate. Yet the possible ways around the dilemma appear 
closed or uncertain at best. The easiest would be a two year deferral 
of the attainment date under 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(e) (1970). But, for 
22 Dep't of Pub. Health, Bureau of Air Quality Control, Reg. 50.1. 
23 An example of this is a variance to two power plants to burn high-sulfur fuel, ap-
proved by EPA on May 9, 1974 and published on May 16, 1974. 39 Fed. Reg. 17442 
(1974). The prologue recites that the variances were a result of correspondence from 
EPA to various governors on Oct. 15, 1973 urging expedited planning for the ex-
pected fuel shortage in the 1973-74 heating season. Among other measures EPA urged 
a comprehensive variance plan to assure that the low-sulfur fuel available was used in 
the areas of greatest need, i.e., areas with the highest SO levels. The DPH reacted 
quickly, granting the subject variances from Jan. 1, 1974 to May 15, 1974 and submit-
ting them for EPA review on Nov. 21, 1973. Yet, despite the state's quick action at EPA 
urging, EPA did not approve the variances for six months, on May 9, 1974, just six 
days before the variances expired. 
24 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-8(b) & (c), 1857h-2 (1970). 
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reasons noted above, this option is not available fon the Massachusetts 
SIP.25 Another option is the one year extension available to particular 
sources under 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(f). But this exte*sion requires EPA 
to find that: (1) the source has made good faith effc(>rts to comply with 
the SIP requirements by the attainment date; (2) ~he necessary tech-
nology was not available for the source to comply! by the attainment 
date; (3) interim measures are available to red6ce public health 
hazards; and (4) the continued operation of the sclurce is essential to 
national security, public health or welfare. 26 Few· sources would be 
able to meet these criteria. In addition, it is not clear whether such an 
extension could be renewed after one year. Moreover, EPA's findings 
must be made on the record after a formal EPA adjudicatory hearing, 
requiring a considerable amount of time and elim~nating, as a practi-
cal matter, EPA's ability to deal with many sour4es in this manner 
with its limited resources. 27 EPA has, in fact, d~scouraged sources 
from pursuing this role. 28 As discussed above, states cannot revise 
their SIP requirements by regulatory changes or' variances without 
going through one of these two procedures. And the First Circuit has 
indicated that states cannot issue administrative orders to sources with 
schedules that extend beyond the statutory compli~nce dates,29 a posi-
tion also suggested by EPA in its proposed regtilations. 30 EPA has 
taken the position that it, however, can issue administrative orders 
that extend beyond the statutory compliance dates~ 1 and it has in fact 
done so in numerous instances. 32 This would appe*r to be contrary to 
the logic prohibiting the states from doing so, bpt the specific lan-
guage in the Clean Air Act giving EPA enforcem,nt authority allows 
it to issue orders requiring compliance within such time as it "deter-
25 See note 7 supra. 
2e 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(f) (1970). 
27 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(f)(2)(A) (1970). See also EPA Office of General Counsel, 
Memorandum of Law entitled "One-Year Postponement Under § 110(F)," Qune 12, 
1973). 
28 EPA's Director of Stationary Source Enforcement, Richard Wilson, discouraged 
this approach in a meeting of the American Bar Association's N~Itural Resources Section 
on Nov. 7, 1974. His stance was challenged by the NRDC ~hich contended that § 
1857c-5(f) was the only manner provided in the Act for extend~ng compliance dates. Its 
reaction was predictable since it is fighting EPA on the ques ion in all circuits and 
four of the five circuits ruling on the question to date have agr ed with the NRDC. See 
notes 17-20 supra; Current Developments, Environ. Rep., Nov. !15, 1974, at 1130-31. 
29 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 478 F.2di 875, 5 E.R.C. 1879 (1st 
Cir. 1973). Quaere whether the court would review or affirm al state or lower court de-
cision which had the effect of granting a source an extensi~n beyond the statutory 
compliance date. 
30 See note 21 supra & accompanying text. , 
31 Current Developments, Environ. Rep., Nov. 15, 1974, at 1125. 
32 Conversations with EPA's Director of Stationary Source Enforcement, Richard Wil-
son. ' 
66
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1974 [1974], Art. 21
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1974/iss1/21
§18.17 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 501 
mines is reasonable. "33 While such an order would place a source on 
an implementation schedule and protect it from criminal prosecution 
under the Act as long as it remained in compliance with the order, it 
would not necessarily forestall a civil suit brought by a citizen under 
the Act to enforce the original SIP ,requirements.34 The only clean 
way out of this dilemma is congressional action to provide a workable 
means of placing sources on compliance schedules during the post-
attainment period and protecting them from further jeopardy as long 
as they remain in compliance with such schedules.35 
33 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(a)(4) (1970). 
34 Citizens are granted authority to seek civil relief against sources in violation of an 
"emission standard or limitation" under the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a)(l) (1970). 
Emissions standards and limitations under the Act require compliance by all sources 
with SIP regulations by the statutory attainment dates. The only statutory avenues of 
extending those dates are 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-5(e), (f) (1970), discussed above. Thus, 
sources not in compliance with all applicable SIP regulations on the statutory attain-
ment dates are in violation of such standards and limitations despite any EPA enforce-
ment order. In fact, the existence of such an order would appear to establish such a 
violation. See Current Developments, Environ. Rep., Nov. 15, 1974, at 1130. 
35 Current Developments, Environ. Rep., Nov. 15, 1974, at 1130. 
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